

# **Information Engagement to Garner Public Support: TTPs from World War II**

**A Monograph  
by  
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## **Abstract**

Information Engagement to Garner Public Support: TTPs from World War II by MAJ K. Brogan Farren, US Army, 46 pages.

There are many critics who have concluded that the US Government has not successfully conducted communication with its public during the current, persistent conflict, but perhaps one of the earliest was Ted Koppel. In 2001, responding to a question from Martin Kalbas to how successful the government is in conveying its message to the American people, Koppel said, "Not very good at all." More recently [2007], Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, "it is just plain embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the internet than America."

In the current conflict against violent extremists and in the pursuit of an acceptable end state in Iraq and Afghanistan-Pakistan, lessons can be learned from the information engagement (IE) operations of World War II (WWII) and applied today to better garner the support of our citizens at home. The fight for hearts and minds does not begin at the water's edge. Our enemies seek to undermine domestic support for our military actions abroad, so we must counter their efforts as part of our strategic communication (SC) campaign.

Public Support for WWII was significant, widespread, and persisted. That level of public support contributed to the success of the war. Because a government for the people and by the people requires their support in its endeavors, looking at successful public affairs campaigns might uncover tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) suitable to the current persistent conflict.

The legal status of a declared war versus a conflict has a direct impact on the type of information, persuasion and propaganda that can be delivered to the American Public and is vastly different. There are some TTPs that are valid in today's information environment such as embedded media and other efforts to provide transparency in message and our use of the language of the enemy to avoid the mistake of using enemy rhetoric to unwittingly advance the enemy cause. The window of opportunity to change our Information Engagement and Strategic Communication is closing for this administration unless there is another catalyst. One such catalyst may be the actions we take as we close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay.

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## Section 1: The Importance of Effective Strategic Communication and Information Engagement

There are many critics who have concluded that the US Government has not successfully conducted communication with its public during the current, persistent conflict, but perhaps one of the earliest was Ted Koppel<sup>1</sup>. In 2001, responding to a question from Martin Kalb<sup>2</sup> as to how successful the government is in conveying its message to the American people, Koppel said, “Not very good at all.”<sup>3</sup> More recently [2007], Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, “it is just plain embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the internet than America.”<sup>4</sup>

In a democracy the opinions of the people influence the various actors in our government, but importantly their voices most resonate with the lawmakers in Congress. The support, or at least acquiescence, of the populace is necessary for a government to remain in power and to pursue state aims. The military is both the instrument of protection for the body of the state, and the instrument of aggression [and defense] by which it may grow more powerful [and protect itself from aggression]. A state becomes more powerful, by gaining greater control of territory, population, resources, trade, and commerce. The state thereby extends its reputation and influence among nations and their populations. Communicating effectively and garnering public support for the state’s strategic use of the military is a vital national interest.

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<sup>1</sup> “Ted Koppel started covering wars in Vietnam but has since covered many others, including the second Persian Gulf war, winning in the process thirty-seven Emmy Awards, six Peabody Awards, and nine Overseas Press Club awards, all while anchoring ABC’s *Nightline*.” Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb. *The Media and the War on Terrorism*. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), pg. 17.

<sup>2</sup> “Martin Kalb is a distinguished former network diplomatic correspondent who was running the Washington office of Harvard’s Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy.” Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb. *The Media and the War on Terrorism*. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), pg. xviii.

<sup>3</sup> Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb. *The Media and the War on Terrorism*. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), pg. 25.

<sup>4</sup> Robert M. Gates. “Landon Lecture Series .” (Manhattan, Kansas: Kansas State University, NOV 26, 2007)..

## Section 2: Introduction

In the current conflict against violent extremists and pursuit of an acceptable end-state in Iraq and Afghanistan-Pakistan, lessons can be learned from the information engagement (IE) operations<sup>5</sup> of World War II (WWII) and applied today to better garner the support of our citizens at home. The fight for hearts and minds does not begin at the water's edge. Our enemies<sup>6</sup> seek to undermine domestic support for our military actions abroad, so we must counter their efforts as part of our strategic communication<sup>7</sup> (SC) campaign.

Public Support for WWII was significant, widespread, and persistent. That level of public support contributed to the success of the war. Because a government for the people and by the people requires their support in its endeavors, looking at successful public affairs campaigns might uncover tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) suitable to the current persistent conflict. However, the culture and

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<sup>5</sup> “*Information engagement* is the integrated employment of public affairs to inform U.S. and friendly audiences; psychological operations, combat camera, U.S. Government strategic communication and defense support to public diplomacy, and other means necessary to influence foreign audiences; and, leader and Soldier engagements to support both efforts.” Headquarters Department of the Army. *FM 3-0 Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: Training and Doctrine Command, 27 FEB 2008), pg 7-3.

<sup>6</sup> “Militant Islam is projected as a transnational threat, exemplified by shadowy networks such as Al-Qaeda, with its alleged links with rogue states like Iraq. An undifferentiated view of Islamic militancy seems to dominate the discourse, in which Lebanon’s Hizbullah, Palestinian Hamas, Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines and Chechen rebels, are all linked as part of a seamless transnational terror network. The fear that WMD may fall into the hands of such networks is at the heart of the US Security agenda.”. Thussu, quotes from: H. Karim. *The Islamic Peril - Media and Global Violence*. Second. (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2002). Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman. "Introduction." In *War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7*, edited by Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman. (London: Sage Publications, 2003)., pg. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Sina Lehmkuhler. "DOD Support for Public Diplomacy Strategic Communication Brief." Strategic Communication Briefing. (Washington, DC: Office of Support for Public Diplomacy (DOD), MAR 7, 2008) The most concise definition for strategic communication as written by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office in Support of Public Diplomacy is: “employing information coupled with actions to align target audience perceptions with policy goals.”. “Strategic communication is a natural extension of strategic direction, and supports the President’s strategic guidance, the SecDef’s NDS, and the CJCS’s NMS. SC planning and execution focus capabilities that apply information as an instrument of national power to create, strengthen, or preserve an information environment favorable to US national interests. SC planning establishes unity of US themes and messages, emphasizes success, accurately confirms or refutes external reporting on US operations, and reinforces the legitimacy of US goals. This is an interagency effort, which provides an opportunity to advance US regional and global partnerships. Coordination, approval, and implementation of an SC strategy and specific information objectives, audiences, themes, and actions will be developed and synchronized with other US agencies and approved by SecDef.” Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Joint Operation Planning." *Joint Publication 5-0*. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, DEC 26, 2006), xii. “Focused US Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of US Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.” Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Information Operations." *Joint Publication 3-13*. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, FEB 13, 2006)., GL-12.

values of modern America, the legal status of ongoing conflicts, and current regulations and laws, may preclude the use of WWII TTPs in garnering domestic support. Still, understanding the differences may lead to better understanding of what is available to those tasked with public affairs in their mission to inform the public and the government's desire to have public support for military actions. Are there changes we can make to our strategic communication strategy to garner more domestic support for our current operations based on lessons gleaned from the public information campaigns of WWII?

The people of a republic have responsibilities to stay informed and critical so that they may wisely participate in its governance. The Department of Defense (DoD) has a duty and an interest in telling the American public what it is doing to oppose and defeat the enemies we face and to promote our American interests.<sup>8</sup> The primary instrument for the Army in communicating with the public is its public affairs (PA) organizations,<sup>9</sup> which work in parallel to, as well as, with the American media.<sup>10</sup> PA thus is both an informer and a first line defender against both misinformation and enemy propaganda. As such, PA defends the "center of gravity" of American Democracy: public support.

America's enemies understand that the Achilles' heel of American freedom of action and ability to sustain military efforts is public support. They seek to use our open society, First Amendment, and new

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<sup>8</sup>"Our military is accountable and responsible to the public for performing its mission of national defense. By providing accurate information and clear explanations of its activities, the Armed Forces of the United States fulfill their responsibility to the nation, contributing to understanding of DOD programs and military operations. The media are the principal means of communicating information about the military to the general public." Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Public Affairs." *Joint Publication 3-61*. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, MAY 9, 2005), pg I-9. "[Public Affairs] has a statutory responsibility to factually and accurately inform various publics without intent to propagandize or manipulate public opinion. Specifically, public affairs facilitates the commander's obligation to support informed U.S. citizenry, U.S. Government decision makers, and as operational requirements may dictate, non-U.S. audiences." Headquarters Department of the Army. *FM 3-0 Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: Training and Doctrine Command, 27 FEB 2008), pg. 7-4.

<sup>9</sup> "Public affairs proactively informs and educates internal and external publics through public information, command information, and direct community engagement. Although all information engagement activities are completely truthful, public affairs is unique. It has a statutory responsibility to factually and accurately inform various publics without intent to propagandize or manipulate public opinion. Specifically, public affairs facilitates the commander's obligation to support informed U.S. citizenry, U.S. Government decision makers, and as operational requirements may dictate, non-U.S. audiences. Effective information engagement requires particular attention to clearly demarking this unique role of public affairs by protecting its credibility. This requires care and consideration when synchronizing public affairs with other information engagement activities. Public affairs and other information engagement tasks must be synchronized to ensure consistency, command credibility, and operations security." Headquarters Department of the Army. *FM 3-0 Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: Training and Doctrine Command, 27 FEB 2008), pg. 7-4.

<sup>10</sup> Carnes Lord. "On the Nature of Strategic Communications." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 46 (Third Quarter 2007): 87-89.



communication technologies to destroy American public support as part of their effort to win in this persistent conflict. This leads to their employment of all forms of information engagement, but it does not prevent them from putting out misinformation. Despite the doctrine on PA<sup>11</sup> and its implied task of anticipating and planning ahead to seize opportunities proactively, the reality appears to be more reactive than proactive. PA is often employed as a reactive tool of the commander rather than as a proactive, synergistic force for the commander. PA does an outstanding job in its necessary task communicating the military's story. However, globalization and technology have made the well-defined but limited role of a story-telling communicator outdated and inefficient. PA's inability to combine effectively with other Information Engagement (IE) activities is an obstacle that some commanders have found challenging. Also challenging is a historical animosity between PA and the media. The release of information in particular has caused friction between PA officers (PAOs) and their media counterparts. PA has improved in relations with the media, but it has fallen behind in integrating and synchronizing with other components of IE.

The problems facing PA today are not novel. Similar problems have plagued our IE efforts throughout the era of mass communication. The US Army's PA is centered on the core principle of presenting accurate information.<sup>12</sup> The basic reasoning is that transparency in U.S. actions and the

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<sup>11</sup> "The idea is to proactively provide information to the media, with one organized and orchestrated effort to get DOD messages to all relevant USG agencies." Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Public Affairs." *Joint Publication 3-61*. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, MAY 9, 2005), pg III-16.

"Principles of Public Affairs:

a. Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by national security constraints or valid statutory mandates or exceptions. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.

b. A free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States and their dependents.

c. Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.

d. Information shall be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.

e. DOD's obligation to provide the public with information on DOD major programs may require detailed PA planning and coordination in DOD and with the other government agencies. Such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public.

f. Propaganda has no place in DOD public affairs programs." Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Public Affairs." *Joint Publication 3-61*. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, MAY 9, 2005), pg I-3.

<sup>12</sup> "Although all information engagement activities are completely truthful, public affairs is unique. It has a statutory responsibility to factually and accurately inform various publics without intent to propagandize or manipulate public

uncensored disclosure of enemy action is more effective than is slanted representation that can border on propaganda. The American public may not be as critical in their consumption of media products as it could be.<sup>13</sup> Americans select information that validates their values. This presents its own set of strategic challenges to good governance in the American republic, but the relevant issue here is the effect upon how military PA meets its challenge to protect the American Public from enemy IE. Communicating information consistent with American values, which is transparent and not propagandistic, will better garner public support for DoD efforts to further the national goals and interests through IE. Therefore, DoD messages should be transparent, free of exaggeration, have minimal bias, be influential, targeted, translated, simple and validated by DoD actions.<sup>14</sup>

### Section 3: Methodology

A comparative method of ‘most different systems’ was used to highlight the IE operating environments of WWII and the current, persistent conflict. A course of inquiry was plotted and defined the parameters of each environment to determine if the methods used in one case could be used in the other case with relative effectiveness and an expectation of success. Most comparativists use the ‘most similar systems’ design: Investigators take two systems that are for the most part, similar, and subsequently study differences that exist between the two similar systems.<sup>15</sup>

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opinion.” Headquarters Department of the Army. *FM 3-0 Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: Training and Doctrine Command, 27 FEB 2008), pg 7-4.

<sup>13</sup> “only a small minority of citizens are skilled in recognizing bias and propaganda in the news disseminated in their country. Only a relatively few are able to detect one-sided portrayals of events or seek out alternative sources of information and opinion to compare with those of their mainstream news media.” Richard Paul and Linda Elder. “The Thinker’s Guide.” *For Conscientious Citizens on How to Detect Media Bias & Propaganda in National and World News*. (Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2006), pg. 2.

<sup>14</sup> “Soldiers’ actions are the most powerful component of information engagement. Visible actions coordinated with carefully chosen, truthful words influence audiences more than either does alone. Local and regional audiences as well as adversaries compare the friendly force’s message with its actions. People measure what they see and what they experience against the commander’s messages.” Headquarters Department of the Army. *FM 3-0 Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: Training and Doctrine Command, 27 FEB 2008), pg 7-4.

<sup>15</sup> Gregory S. Mahler. *Comparative Politics: An Institutional and Cross-National Approach*. Second. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), pg 6. Gregory S. Mahler is an American political scientist with a general interest in comparative politics, and more specific interests in legislatures and constitutionalism. In 2007 he moved to Earlham College, in Richmond, Indiana, where he is Academic Dean and Vice President for Academic Affairs. Professor Mahler’s scholarly work has been published widely. He has contributed to numerous journals and edited volumes, and has authored or edited over twenty-five books that fall into three broad groups: comparative politics, politics of Israel and the Middle East, and politics of Canada.

The idea being that if the differences between the two systems are small, the differences warrant explanation. There is however, a different comparative method of a 'most different systems' approach and this is the one used in this research endeavor. This approach allows us to select two or more systems for comparison that may not be essentially similar. Instead of looking for differences between two or more essentially different systems, we look for the similarities.<sup>16</sup>

WWII provides a useful case study because it was a long, global war. America's direct military involvement began with the attack on the U.S. Territory of Pearl Harbor. The American public, in large part and for its duration, supported the war effort.<sup>17</sup> The public then supported the rebuilding of nations in the post-war era. WWII had a successful strategic communication and information engagement plan, which developed and maintained the American public's awareness, understanding and support of the war effort. President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked for sacrifice and individual effort to forward Four Freedoms<sup>18</sup> and to secure democracy in his State of the Union address to Congress almost a year prior to the U.S. military involvement in WWII. The public answered his call and made sacrifices and contributions over four years of world war and into the era of Cold War against the Soviet Union.

WWII differs from our current situation in that it was a formally declared war. The U.S. in WWII achieved the unconditional surrender of its enemies, which is neither a stated goal nor a desired end state in the current conflict. Unconditional surrender, however, does open the door to occupation and reconstruction with fewer limitations and greater acceptance than the undefined conditions for conflict

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<sup>16</sup> Gregory S. Mahler. *Comparative Politics: An Institutional and Cross-National Approach*. Second. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), pg. 7.

<sup>17</sup> "The last time we had a national consensus on values was World War II." William M. Darley. "The Missing Component of US Strategic Communications." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (nduparess.ndu.edu), no. 47 (Fourth Quarter 2007): 109-113.

<sup>18</sup> Franklin D. Roosevelt. *Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum*. JAN 6, 1941. <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/4free.html> (accessed NOV 11, 2008). FDR Addressed Congress on 6 January, 1941 and near the end of his speech he listed the four freedoms which outlined the foundation for his grand strategy. "In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression--everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way--everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want--which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings, which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants--everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear--which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor--anywhere in the world."

termination in the current conflict. The formal declaration of war in WWII allowed for governmental and military censorship and control of information.<sup>19</sup>

The full-scale mobilization of industrial-era warfare was also at work. This was done in a context of rising power for central authority, which was part of the overall social transformation that came with industrialization and the explosion of mass media (radio, film, newspapers, and widespread literacy) that attended creating an industrial age workforce and mass armies in the post-Napoleonic world of more or less 'popular rule.'<sup>20</sup>

The press put on uniforms and became an integral part of the state's war effort.<sup>21</sup> The press had a respect for the office of the President, and its holder, that has not been witnessed since the Vietnam conflict and Watergate. The number of servicemen and women who actively fought in WWII is almost 16 times more than have served in Iraq or otherwise in support of OIF.<sup>22</sup> The 1940 Census set the United States' population at 131.66 million<sup>23</sup>, which means the 12.2% of the population actively served in

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<sup>19</sup> Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb. *The Media and the War on Terrorism*. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), pg. 25. In a panel discussion of distinguished war correspondents on 31 OCT 2001, Ted Koppel said, "Not since World War II has there been a declaration of war. So to talk about censorship the way that we discuss it in the context of World War II is not relevant to the Korean War, it's not relevant to any of these petty little engagements that we've been involved in since then. It certainly is not relevant to the Vietnam War. War was never declared. So the issue of the military or the government actually imposing censorship in a legal fashion, never arose."

<sup>20</sup> Weaver, M. Scott, interview by K. Brogan Farren. Director Department of Joint Military Operations, Command and General Staff School (FEB 19, 2009). COL M. Scott Weaver is the Director of the Department of Joint Military Operations at the Command and General Staff College. He is a Strategic Planner for the US Army.

<sup>21</sup> "Daniel Schorr is the last of Edward R. Murrow's legendary CBS Team still active in journalism. He began his 22 year career as a foreign correspondent in 1946 and now is senior news analyst for National Public Radio." Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb. *The Media and the War on Terrorism*. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), pg. 17. In a panel discussion of distinguished war correspondents on 31 OCT 2001, Daniel Schorr said in a story about the misidentification between the CBS Correspondent in an Army uniform trying to get information for a story from a person, he thought to be a commander but who was in reality the NBC Correspondent, "The NBC Correspondent was in a Navy uniform. All of this betokened the fact that in World War II correspondents knew which side they were on. They were part of something called the war effort....They would go and ask, "Would it be harmful if I reported this?" "It is important to remember that because that is an era of history where the press and the military worked closely together, being sure of the rectitude of what they were doing and why they were doing it, and that got lost somewhere [between WWII and now]" Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb. *The Media and the War on Terrorism*. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), pg. 20.

<sup>22</sup> Table 523 of the 2004 Census Report [<http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/03statab/defense.pdf>] quotes the number of people serving in WWII as 16.113 million. Kathy Gill, author of *Five Years after 9/11 by the Numbers* [[http://uspolitics.about.com/od/antiterrorism/a/9\\_11\\_numbers.htm](http://uspolitics.about.com/od/antiterrorism/a/9_11_numbers.htm)] puts the total number of servicemen and women at 1.35 million in Iraq and Afghanistan as of 2006. Which is roughly 1/16th of the force who served in the four years WWII lasted.

<sup>23</sup> US Census Bureau. *American Fact Finder*. 2009. [http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?\\_lang=en](http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en) (accessed JAN 25, 2009).

WWII. By comparison, 0.44% of the 300 million strong present day American public<sup>24</sup> has served in the first five years of the current conflict. This difference in percentage of population who have served shows a great difference in the number of Americans directly impacted by war, and thus in those likely to feel compelled or inclined to support the war. Despite the differences between the wars, the principles of SC and IE can be seen at work in both. Why one IE effort was vastly more successful in garnering the support of the citizenry of the United States of America warrants study.

## Section 4: Communications Innovations That Revolutionized the Military

Eric V. Larson<sup>25</sup> stated in regard to the effects of technology on the operating environment that,

“Although the media may not have the impact on the substantive policy preferences of the public that some impute to it, technological and other advances could have a profound effect on democratic governance. Perhaps the most important effects would be a *perception* among policy makers that the electronic media are shortening their decision cycles and the increasing availability of “flash” polling that often reflects little more than ephemeral and transitory opinion.”<sup>26</sup>

The differences between the technology of today and the technology of WWII are exponential. The global impact of the internet<sup>27</sup> alone is enough to separate the two periods by light years. How far we have come in information technology and its impact on information warfare is well laid out by Alberts, et al.”<sup>28</sup> These authors walk the reader through theory, language and application of Information Warfare

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<sup>24</sup> US Census Bureau. *American Fact Finder*. 2009. [http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?\\_lang=en](http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en) (accessed JAN 25, 2009). The US Census Bureau web page which reports the United States population to be 305.68 million.

<sup>25</sup> Eric V. Larson is a Senior Policy Researcher for Rand Corporation with a Ph.D. in policy analysis, RAND Graduate School (now the Pardee RAND Graduate School); A.B. in political science, University of Michigan. He is the author of *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operation*.

<sup>26</sup> Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations*, MRC-726-RC (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 25 April 1996), p. 6.

<sup>27</sup> Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb. *The Media and the War on Terrorism*. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), pg 25. In a panel discussion of distinguished war correspondents on 31 OCT 2001, Ted Koppel said, “the Internet was, of course, designed by the US military for one reason and one reason alone: for survivability in the case of a nuclear attack so that commanders would be able to communicate with one another after a nuclear attack. So if the whole purpose of creating the Internet was to survive a nuclear attack, who in his right mind thinks that you are any more going to be able to control information?”

<sup>28</sup> David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, Richard E. Hayes, and David T. Singori. *Understanding Information Age Warfare*. (Washington D.C.: DoD Command and Control Research Program, 2004). David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, Richard E. Hayes and David T. Singori are members of the Command and Control Research Program, tasked with improving DoD’s understanding of the national security implications of the Information Age focusing

(IW). Their conclusion reads like a road map for the way ahead to successful conduct of IW. Today we face a 24/7 news cycle that was not present in WWII. News is instantaneous and continuous, and this does not allow for the consideration [thoughtful and skilled writing] and verification [nor the censoring and suppression] that information from battlefronts had in the 1940s.<sup>29</sup>

Innovations in communications technology have always been adaptations communicators have had to make, and not just advancement from 1940 to 2009.<sup>30</sup> The new communication technology during the U.S. Civil War was the telegraph. The generals of the Civil War were, in essence, sending text messages to each other using the telegraph as a rapid means of communication. In WWII, radar was a new information system, which had the same impact on operations that blue force tracker, has in the current conflict. Codes and encryption continue to evolve as do computers, radios, and imagery. Technological changes and improvements are nothing new and nothing to fear or allow to impede efforts.

Technology does create some revolutions in military affairs, but too much has been made about new technology and its impact on the military's ability to communicate.<sup>31</sup> The military demands and has adaptive leaders. Leveraging the strengths of the military may require using the newer military members' technological experience. Much in the way one generation turned to their children to teach them how to program the video recorder, the leaders of the military may turn to the youngest members to teach them to use the technology available. It is a natural and adaptive trait to find those who know to teach those who

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on Command and Control. This book is a continuation in the series of publications produced by the Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology. It develops the theoretical foundations to provide DoD with information superiority and highlights the importance of active outreach to acquaint senior military leaders with emerging issues.<sup>29</sup> Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb. *The Media and the War on Terrorism*. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003)., pg. 20.

<sup>30</sup> "All of this mixing of wars, technologies, and journalism is nothing new, of course, and dates back in American history at least to the Mexican-American War in 1846, when the newly invented telegraph intensified reporter's competition for battlefield scoops. Still, then as now, the mixing deserves special attention because of the consequences, predictable and unexpected, that always follow." Hess, Stephen, and Marvin Kalb, . *The Media and the War on Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003, pg. 8.

<sup>31</sup> "Their trouble is that they're [DoD] being defeated today not so much by the American press as by technology. I mean when you get the people appearing on television live over there and issuing their statements about what is wrong with America and so on, or when you get al Jazerra getting interviews, how do you stop it?" Hess, Stephen, and Marvin Kalb, . *The Media and the War on Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003, pg. 24.

do not know. Facilitating adaptations to new technologies<sup>32</sup> may require changes in procurement and information management and are outside the scope of this paper. Adapting is a constant in the military and should be accepted as the norm so that unnecessary fear of technology is not created, which could in turn hamper DoD's efforts.

## Section 5: Literature Review

Two books look at the actions President Roosevelt took to communicate war information to the public as well as overseas. The *Politics of Propaganda* looks deeper into the actions of the Office of War Information while *Cautious Crusade* addresses the measurements of the effectiveness<sup>33</sup> of information in reaching the public.

The media, the military and other government agencies have all been critical in current strategic communication with the American public. Torie Clark gives insight into the strategic communication from the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld and the positive aspects of the Pentagon's communications in the first 18 months of the current conflict. Clark praises DoD PA efforts and Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's efforts for giving timely and truthful information to the media during the 9/11 attacks, the aftermath, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and for the widest and least restrictive, access to the battlefield for the media in history through the embed program during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). *On Point* and *On Point II* are introspective works from the US Army and they explain the failures of strategic communication of the military from the onset of persistent conflict to January 2005. This series is excellent for tying in all the aspects and tools of strategic communication and their impact on the mission as well as the impact on our public. It highlights the fickleness of American public support, in

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<sup>32</sup> "Microprocessing, miniaturization, automation, electronics, communications and space technologies are continually changing the way and pace at which operations are conducted." Headquarters Department of the Army. "Field Manual 46-1." *Public Affairs*. (Washington, DC: Training and Doctrine Command, May 1997), pg. 9.

<sup>33</sup> "Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and uses measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that support strategic and operational mission accomplishment. Strategic- and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the military end state. Continuous assessment helps the JFC and joint force component commanders determine if the joint force is 'doing the right things' to achieve its objectives, not just 'doing things right.'" Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Operations." *Joint Publication 3-0*. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, FEB 13, 2008), pg IV-32.

that the support follows tactical success on the battlefield, more than it does the communication efforts of the military. Strategic communication has dramatically improved through concerted efforts of the DoD.<sup>34</sup> For a contrasting and complimentary perspective from the viewpoints of the media, the primary source for information from the government to its public, *The Media and the War on Terrorism* and *War and the Media were used*. These two books are compilations of panel discussions and articles conducted with and written by distinguished war correspondents. *War and the Media* explains the dramatic differences in today's news environment to include the increased speed and global impact of stories, which were once purely written for domestic audiences. *The Media and the War on Terrorism* contains the voices of the reporters and delves into their fears, frustrations, and expectations of covering a war.

Covering WWI had its frustrations to be sure. However, both sides, the government and the media were active and for the most part cooperative. While largely cooperative, Franklin D. Roosevelt did not wait on the media to send his message; for fear that, the reporter's bias may distort his message. He often took his message directly to the public. In essence, Franklin D. Roosevelt was a great experimenter in strategic communications. He sent out a message, monitored its reception<sup>35</sup> and then adjusted his message. Following his example, his 'image and communication machine' --made up of the office of facts and figures (OFF), the office of war information (OWI), the office of strategic services (OSS)-- all sent out messages based on his strategy and themes; monitored the reaction/reception; made minor adjustments to gain the desired impact and resulting action from the American public. The

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<sup>34</sup> Defense Science Board. *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*. (Washington DC: Department of Defense, January 2008). The Defense Science Board conducted discussions and working groups focused on Strategic Communication from 2001 to 2006 with recommendations for improvements in their report and road map. Roadmap, QDR. Defense Science Board. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication. Quadriennial Review, (Washington DC: Department of Defense, January 2008). *QDR Execution Roadmap Strategic Communication, Draft 16 Feb 2006*. (Washington, DC: US Government, 2006). Several of their suggestions lead to improvement in Strategic Communication. DoD Strategic Communication Integration Group. *DoD Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan*. Communication Plan, Joint Staff, Department of Defense, (Washington, DC: Deputy Secretary of Defense, 12 SEP 2007, 1-18). The Strategic Communication Integration Group was formed at the joint staff level of the Pentagon and served as a coordination center and planning center for DoD Strategic Communication and their resultant product was a Strategic Communication plan for Afghanistan. DoD Strategic The focus in Joint publications and Army Field Manuals recently on Strategic Communication brings it to the forefront of military operations.

<sup>35</sup> Steven Casey. *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pg.15-20, 30-45. FDR used polling data to drive his strategic communication with the nation to educate, persuade, unite, and lead. ..



American public rallied to the cause,<sup>36</sup> won the greatest victory, and secured America's place as leader of the free world. The dissemination of information in WWII was a combination of deliberate propaganda and more objective presentation and reportage. Persistent conflict today requires transparency and rigorous adherence to objective presentation since regulation and law prohibit propagandizing. Declared wars, however, can remove some of these restrictions and enable the use propaganda where information must be carefully compiled and disseminated while never losing sight of the ultimate objective: defeat of the enemy.

Managing the image the US military presents to the American public is a key IE function in gaining support. The image the US Military portrays<sup>37</sup> should be one of competence, confidence, lethality, professionalism; and it should mirror American Values. William Darley and Allen Winkler<sup>38</sup> both point out that Strategic Communication with the domestic audience reinforces American values. Darley argues that the problem with current IE is the lack of consensus on what those American values currently are and which values to portray.<sup>39</sup> Winkler states that the struggle over the basic values of the war led to challenges for the Office of Information in sending out its message in WWII.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> "WWII was unique in that the American crusade on Nazism was popular". Steven Casey. *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pg. xvii.

<sup>37</sup> Victoria Clark. *Lipstick on a Pig*. (New York: Free Press, 2006), pg. 232. In Time Magazine's Person of the Year article in 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld said this about the American Soldier: "When they arrive at the recruiter's door 'they have purple hair and an earring, and they've never walked with another person in step in their life. And suddenly they get this training, in a matter of weeks, and they become part of a unit, a team. They're all sizes and shapes, and they're different ages, and they're different races, and you cannot help when you work with them but come away feeling that that is really a special thing that this country has.' "

<sup>38</sup> Allen Winkler was an assistant professor of history at Yale University when he wrote *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*, in 1978. His book has become one of most definitive works on the OWI and WWII propaganda.

<sup>39</sup> William M. Darley. "The Missing Component of US Strategic Communications." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (nduparess.ndu.edu), no. 47 (Fourth Quarter 2007): 109-113 Colonel William M. Darley, USA, is a public affairs officer and editor-in-chief of *Military Review*, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

<sup>40</sup> Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978)., pg. 6.

## Section 5: Strategic Communication in WWII

### Strategic Communication and Propaganda

Propaganda was not a word in favor in 1941, however, it was more common. “Propaganda” was not in favor because of the ill will gained through the actions in World War I (WWI) of the Creel Committee on Public Information.<sup>41</sup> Propaganda also lost favor due to the association with critical attitudes that accompanied the remarkable growth of advertising in the years between the wars.<sup>42</sup> After delivering his Four Freedoms speech, which served to provide context for the American public, FDR and his cabinet then proceeded to persuade the public to assist in the war effort through the persuasive techniques Dr. Pratkanis<sup>43</sup> defines in his book, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. Using these definitions as a lens to review FDR’s speech and consequently his future strategic communiques with the American public, FDR used the techniques of “repetition,” “fear,” “committed heart,” “information campaigns,” “norm of reciprocity,” “guilt,” and “granfaloon.”<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 3. The problem of being identified with the propaganda of the Creel’s Committee for Public Information (CPI) was that “Creel accomplished his task too well. As his agency sought to arouse America, it stirred up hatred of all things German. Portrayed as Barbaric Huns, Germans appears intent on conquering the world for their own selfish ends. German spies, the CPI hinted, were everywhere. Anyone voicing the least sympathy for anything German might well be a traitor in disguise. The CPI did spark support for the war, but it also helped stir up the hysteria that led unthinking Americans to rename sauerkraut ‘liberty cabbage’ and hamburger ‘Salisbury steak’.”

<sup>42</sup> Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 4.

<sup>43</sup> Anthony Pratkanis is Professor of Psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz, where he studies social psychology, social influence, and prejudice reaction. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. Revised. (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2001), pg. 415.

<sup>44</sup> “**Familiarity** breeds attraction, liking, and even “truth.” Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. Revised. (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2001), pg. 180. “Experimental data overwhelmingly suggest that all other things being equal, the more **frightened** a person is by a communication, the more likely he or she is to take positive preventative action.” Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. Revised. (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2001), pg. 210. “When individuals **commit** themselves in a small way, the likelihood they will commit themselves further in the direction is increased.” Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. Revised. (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2001), pg. 236-7. “**Information campaigns** frequently fail to change attitudes, a fact of persuasive life that was observed by Herbert Hyman and Paul Sheatsly as far back as 1947.” As quoted in *Age of Propaganda* {Hyman, H, & Sheatsley, P.B. (1947). Some reasons why information campaigns fail. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 11, 412-423.} “Despite this, information campaigns are as common as ever.” “The use of entertaining programs to disseminate a point of view has been successful in achieving high audience ratings and in changing people’s attitudes and behaviors.” Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. Revised. (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2001), pg. 282-3. “The **norm of reciprocity** is such a norm. It states: ‘If I do something for you, then you are obliged to do

In addition to laying the moral rationale for America's entry into the war,<sup>45</sup> President Roosevelt joined with Winston Churchill to propose a combined vision of the world after victory. In the Atlantic Charter, Churchill specifically included such fundamental principals as self-determination, fair trade, and a system of general security. Based on these two communications—the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter Speeches--the communicators and operators of WWII built the framework for their strategy, operations and mission.<sup>46</sup> It is worth noting that the communicator is first performer in the line of actions leading to military operations. The strategic commander gives his intent, describes the end state, and aids others in their visualization and understanding of the mission. This is the commander as communicator, telling the operators what to do having determined the message he wants to send. There was, of course, friction between the early arrivals in the propaganda ranks, those who were idealists fighting for democracy and liberty, and those who eventually picked up the torch and accepted the reality that politics is best left ambiguous. The communicators in OWI struggled in their perceived duty, suffering from a lack of clear guidance and support for their idealistic views and motivations. The appeals to the domestic audience were less intense than those sent overseas because of the fear of resurrecting the hatred of the Creel Committee on Public Information. The domestic messages, focused on facts about the war, were intended to educate the public so they could draw the conclusion that the government was doing the right thing to secure victory for the right reasons.<sup>47</sup>

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something for me.” “**Guilt Sells** – a fact of persuasive life that seems to be intuitively grasped by parents, teachers, clergy, charities, and life insurance agents.” Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. Revised. (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2001)., pg. 223. “After delivering his Four Freedoms speech, which served to provide context for the American public, Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. Revised. (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2001)., pg. 188-195. “**Granfalloon** –proud and meaningless associations of human beings.” {Vannegut, K.(1963). *Cat's Cradle*. New York: Dell.} “[People] act as if they like those who share [a granfalloon, or meaningless label].” Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. Revised. (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2001)., pg 216.

<sup>45</sup> Franklin D. Roosevelt. *Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum*. JAN 6, 1941. <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/4free.html> (accessed NOV 11, 2008).

<sup>46</sup> Allen M.Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978)., pg. 5.

<sup>47</sup> Allen M.Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978)., pg. 6.

The basic direction of the strategic communication campaign began to take shape just before America was attacked at Pearl Harbor and entered the war. The leader of the propaganda machine was Archibald MacLeish.<sup>48</sup> McLeish's main aim was to help Americans understand their role in securing the outcome of the war to stave off the dangers he foresaw if the fascist nations won.<sup>49</sup> The national strategic communication team was made up of people particularly talented in letters: poets; writers; scholars; ivy-league graduates; lawyers; as well as the well traveled and internationally connected. Creativity was a key to their success, as was their power of persuasion.<sup>50</sup> Dr. Pratkanis explains in detail the effectiveness and employment of the methods of propaganda and persuasion used by the ever growing and talented pool of WWII Propagandists.<sup>51</sup>

## **Strategic Communication in WWII**

Roosevelt had Strategic Communication on his mind from day one. On 4 MAR 1933, FDR took the oath of office. In his inaugural speech, he began the task of trying to revive hope and confidence, famously assuring his audience that they had nothing to “fear but fear itself” before stressing his intention to act boldly and quickly. Thus, he entered into a ‘war’ against the economic emergency.<sup>52</sup> Later he would enter into another type of war, which would require even more assurances to the American public to keep the support they so readily gave when they first elected him president. He got and kept their support.

In 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “My problem is to get the American people to think of conceivable consequences without scaring the American people into thinking that they are going to be

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<sup>48</sup> Allen M.Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 9. Archibald MacLeish and Robert Emmet Sherwood, both literary figures, both anti-fascists, helped map out the course of American propaganda in the early days of WWII.

<sup>49</sup> Allen M.Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 11.

<sup>50</sup> Allen M.Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978)., pg. 9,10, 55,59.

<sup>51</sup> Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. Revised. (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2001)., pg . 121-258.

<sup>52</sup> Steven Casey. *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pg. 3.

dragged into this war.”<sup>53</sup> This was his greatest SC challenge. He met this challenge almost singlehandedly with patience, artful oratory, and the skilled use of third parties to float his message without attribution. By the time Pearl Harbor was attacked, FDR had the nation prepared, participating in and willing to support the war. FDR used all the persuasion techniques to set in motion a supportive public.

Although SC was not a term used in WWII to describe the operations of PA, IO, PSYOPS, Combat Camera, United States Government (USG) Strategic Communication (SC) and Office for Support of Public Diplomacy (OSPD)<sup>54</sup>; all of these operations were conducted, albeit by several agencies. President Roosevelt was initially resistant to any information office that resembled the Committee of Public Information led by Mr. George Creel in WWI. George Creel became synonymous with propaganda and advertising. His tactics earned the disdain of an American Public because they felt misled and misinformed. The Creel committee,<sup>55</sup> as the CPI was often called, created a legacy of suspicion.<sup>56</sup> Despite his hesitation, by late 1942, Roosevelt needed an office to handle the information campaign. When the war began, Roosevelt used the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) to provide information in a factual and statistical format. The Office of Government Reports (OGR) and the Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCI) assisted in sending out the government’s messages. In late 1942,

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<sup>53</sup> Steven Casey. *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pg. 3.

<sup>54</sup> Thom Shanker. "Pentagon Closes Office Accused of Issuing Propaganda Under Bush." *The New York Times Politics*. APR 15, 2009. [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/politics/16policy.html?\\_r=1&emc=eta1](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/politics/16policy.html?_r=1&emc=eta1) (accessed APR 17, 2009). OSPD closed as this paper was in the final stages of editing. Because President Obama’s administration is conducting diplomacy less from the DoD agency and more from the DoS agency than President George W. Bush’s Administration, this office was closed. It will undoubtedly be replaced with a new office and new title as the need for coordination between DoS and DoD on SC has not gone away. The closure is in and of itself a strategic communication that diplomacy in the new administration will have more importance than military might.

<sup>55</sup> Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 3. The problem of being identified with the propaganda of the Creel’s Committee for Public Information (CPI) was that “Creel accomplished his task too well. As his agency sought to arouse America, it stirred up hatred of all things German. Portrayed as Barbaric Huns, Germans appears intent on conquering the world for their own selfish ends. German spies, the CPI hinted, were everywhere. Anyone voicing the least sympathy for anything German might well be a traitor in disguise. The CPI did spark support for the war, but it also helped stir up the hysteria that led unthinking Americans to rename sauerkraut ‘liberty cabbage’ and hamburger ‘Salisbury steak’.”

<sup>56</sup> Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 4. Because propaganda was used on the domestic population of Germany as it has been throughout totalitarian and dictator regimes, the fear of a government gone astray of the American ideals of “for the people and by the people”, made propaganda incongruous with American values.

Roosevelt created the Office of War Information (OWI) to handle the responsibilities of all three, OFF, OGR, & OCI. Also in June 1942, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was formed.

William Donovan led the OSS, and this intelligence agency eventually became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). During WWII, the OSS performed information engagement operations overseas in the form of intelligence gathering, psychological operations, propaganda, and military deception. The OWI also had offices overseas performing many of the same tasks and the additional task of counter-propaganda, which took the form of Voice of America.

The stateside offices of the OWI were responsible for getting the government's message to the American people. These offices held several bureaus including Publications and Graphics,<sup>57</sup> Motion Pictures,<sup>58</sup> Intelligence,<sup>59</sup> Domestic Radio,<sup>60</sup> and Campaigns. Many successful men<sup>61</sup> led these bureaus under the director of the OWI, Elmer Davis.<sup>62</sup> Together these bureaus created some of the most successful information campaigns in American history. The campaigns promoted such actions as accepting and abiding by rationing, increasing factory production, moving women into the work force to free men to fight, planting victory gardens to provide their own vegetables, eating sweet meats and other nutritional education, buying war bonds, conceptualizing the post war world<sup>63</sup>, and keeping their "lips

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<sup>57</sup> Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 55.

<sup>58</sup> "Movies could clarify complex problems for people who were less inclined to read newspapers and other written materials, and the seductive qualities of the screen could help generate the support the nation needed." { Richard Dyer MacCann, *The People's Films: A Political History of U.S. Government Motion Pictures*, p. 118; Gregory D. Black and Clayton R. Koppes, "OWI Goes to the Movies: The Bureau of Intelligence's Criticism of Hollywood, 1942-1943," p. 48; Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, "What to Show the World: The office of War Information and Hollywood, 1942-1945," pp.89-90. } Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg.58.

<sup>59</sup> Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg.58.

<sup>60</sup> Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 58-63.

<sup>61</sup> Archibald MacLeish was the assistant director in charge of the Policy Development Branch. Robert Sherwood headed the Overseas Branch. Milton Eisenhower became the associate director of OWI. Gardner Cowles, Jr., a moderate Midwestern newspaper publisher, became the director of the Domestic Branch. Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 39.

<sup>62</sup> Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg.38-39.

<sup>63</sup> "In the early winter of 1942, the OWI board began to consider their role in stimulating interest in the postwar world. This was in response to the question, "what are we fighting for?" The OWI also needed to, according to

sealed.” Those campaigns are memorable, in part because of the ubiquitous and enduring posters and film clips associated with them. The wide gamut of media outlets exploited to deliver these campaigns to the American public required a complex strategic plan of enormous proportions, depth and magnitude. These campaigns appealed to Americans on a variety of levels: duty, fear, honor, patriotism, helping others, responsibility and greed, to name a few. The propaganda and persuasion used in these campaigns were artful and avoided the pitfalls of the CPI. The enemy was shown in demon-like caricatures, with a racist view. However, the enemy was portrayed as the Nazis and not all Germans, which allowed for reconciliation after the war’s end. Racist or demonic portrayals of an enemy today would likely cause more of a backlash against the government.<sup>64</sup>

The initial “rally around the flag”<sup>65</sup> fervor often brings a unified hatred of a common enemy even if it is wrongly placed. Therefore, it is not necessary to further demonize the enemy, but rather sufficient

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MacLeish, counter the political leaders who had begun to say that there was nothing to decide in a postwar world...all we had to do was to stop everything we were doing and the world would return to normalcy.” Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg.41.

<sup>64</sup> “Because of these cultural changes, many in the U.S. Government today are used to instinctive rejection of anything that might subject them to accusations of ethnic insensitivity, racism, or lack of multicultural tolerance. As a result, many now have a virtually instinctive impulse to avoid challenging any religion or culture, no matter how openly organized or threatening and belligerent such a cultural movement might be to American interests.” “Not surprisingly, in contrast to the overtly nationalistic and even racist messages characteristic of the U.S. Government’s strategic communications during World War II, the messages of the U.S.-led coalition today are abstract, obsessively inoffensive, and tepid.” William M. Darley. “The Missing Component of US Strategic Communications.” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (ndupareass.ndu.edu), no. 47 (Fourth Quarter 2007): 109-113.

<sup>65</sup> “The same pattern of public support rising in correlation with demonstrations of decisive military action has been observable over time during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In the early phases, the Gallup Poll recorded a dramatic jump in domestic US approval for the President’s handling of the war in Iraq, rising from 55 percent in December 2002 to 76 percent approval in April 2003, correlating with the highly visible and successful combat operations specifically directed at the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime. Subsequently, popular support for both the President and the war steeply declined as events in Iraq settled into a pattern of what many in the public apparently regarded as inertia and stagnation, reaching its nadir in June 2004 with 51 percent disapproval in both an ABC News/*Washington Post* survey and a CBS News/*New York Times* survey and 49 percent disapproval in a Gallup Poll for roughly the same period. However, following similar “rally round the flag” patterns observed in conjunction with events in previous conflicts, public confidence in the President as reflected in all major polls had a modest but significant uptick in apparent correlation to bold military actions associated with counterinsurgency operations in Fallujah from September through November 2004, as well as after positive events stemming from determined coalition support of Iraq’s elections and the resulting Iraqi voter turnout. This was registered in a 52 percent approval rating in the ABC News/*Washington Post* survey in January 2005 and a 57 percent approval rating as recorded by a Gallup Poll in early February 2005. The CBS News/*New York Times* survey recorded a 49 percent approval for roughly the same time period, up from 42 percent in June 2004. The same “rally round the flag” phenomenon has been evident in other instances of US military expeditionary intervention.” William M. Darley. “War Policy, Public Support and the Media.” *Parameters* (US Army War College), (Summer 2005): 121-134.

to reiterate the justification for military action based on the factual acts of the enemy. Repeating the justification for U.S. actions is necessary to sustain support in the long conflict. WWII propaganda was a strategic communication marvel. However, those successes did not mean that OWI was always successful or even respected.

The OWI had challenges from the start.<sup>66</sup> First, there was the President's business style and his reluctance in committing publicly to controversial ideas.<sup>67</sup> However, managing the chaos was a strength of President Roosevelt and, in doing so, he probably did get the most creative and best options available despite the angst he caused among those who worked for him. He began his campaign by warning the American people of the threat to their way of life. "The real aim was to persuade the American public, by the straightforward presentation of the facts of war, that the outcome of the struggle was of the utmost importance to everyone at home."<sup>68</sup>

The OWI had to compete with the other informational offices for resources and access to the president. Another challenge within the administration came from the president himself. The message from the president's office was often different from rhetoric and reality. The OWI had responsibility for the coordinated message of governmental offices, but no authority to force a unified message. The OWI often ran crosswise against the Departments of State, War and Navy.<sup>69</sup> This shows that interagency rivalry is nothing new, particularly where unified messages are concerned.

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<sup>66</sup> "The first difficulties stemmed from the public fears of propaganda that emerged soon after World War I, lingered on for decades, and never really died away. Those fears generated carping criticisms, both inside and outside of the government, that were often unfounded but still hampered the effective functioning of the agency. More serious troubles came from the growing disagreements OWI encountered over American aims in the war." Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 1.

<sup>67</sup> Steven Casey. *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 40-41, 45. Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). President Roosevelt had been a member of President Wilson's administration and remembered the hate and hysteria caused by the Creel Committee and was cautious to avoid a repeat and loss of public opinion.

<sup>68</sup> Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 18.

<sup>69</sup> Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 44. The OWI threatened the weak Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, in overseas information and he was a constant foe, who claimed the organization was irresponsible and too far reaching. In particular, the Secretary of State charged that the OWI wanted to make policy and not simply use it.



There were questions about whether there was any place at all for an information branch at home, but the OWI established a Domestic Branch and the matter was moot. How the branch would proceed was still in question<sup>70</sup>. Elmer Davis's top aides met daily to determine propaganda policy, and they did not agree on the role the domestic branch of the OWI would play.<sup>71</sup> MacLeish and the OWI became formally involved in the propaganda program even though a democracy had to be careful about the manipulation of opinion<sup>72</sup>. Propaganda will continue to be a tenuous item in American Democracy, needed, used, feared and avoided

Unlike a dictatorship, it could not baldly tell its people what to think. Rather, MacLeish declared, 'The government of a democracy, by virtue of its existence as a democratic government, has a very different function in relation to the making of opinion. It is the government's function to see to it that the people have the facts before them – the facts on which opinions can be formed.' Democratic propaganda had to be based on the 'strategy of truth,' which involved giving out the honest facts about the struggle, and then trusting the people to make up their own minds in the right way.<sup>73</sup>

Despite these challenges, differences in goals and opinion, the OWI was a successful propaganda agency. They were successful in changing beliefs and motivating Americans to support the war by changing their behavior and culture. The Success of the OWI was predicated on the loss and public acceptance of loss of some rights and the need for governmental control during the war. They valued their way of live in the long term over their loss of guaranteed freedoms and rights in the short term. The management of expectations coupled with reciprocity, fear and granfaloons was a holistic approach to garnering public support.

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<sup>70</sup> { Feller, "OWI on the Home Front," pp.56-57. } as quoted in Allen M.Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 39.

<sup>71</sup> Allen M.Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 39.

<sup>72</sup> Allen M.Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 39.

<sup>73</sup> {MacLeish, Address at Inaugural Dinner, Freedom House, 19 March 1942, Beinecke Library; Archibald MacLeish, Press Conference, 21 January 1942, Box 42, Records of OWI. } as quoted in Allen M.Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).

## Measurements of Effectiveness

The success of SC during WWII was carefully monitored. Roosevelt watched polls constantly, distrusted the press<sup>74</sup>, and felt he was the best spokesperson for his branch of government. He was the one voice Americans heard and trusted most. In March of 1941, he requested the first survey of editorial opinion from the Department of the Treasury and later received similar surveys from the OFF. In July 1941, FDR requested the OGR prepare a weekly final screening of editorial opinion. The OGR used basic statistical techniques to monitor editorials of over 300 papers, journals and magazines across the country.<sup>75</sup> FDR monitored the opinions of prominent groups and moods in key regions through informal back channel connections<sup>76</sup> for color, shade, and the hidden human dimension<sup>77</sup> that was often lacking from conventional sources.<sup>78</sup> Eleanor Roosevelt's tireless trips around the country provided information through personal contact with the public. Eleanor's personal approach was an extension of his own efforts. FDR spent a quarter of each day either on the phone or engaged in face-to-face meetings. He had biweekly press conferences and regular meetings with regional leaders. The White House also received

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<sup>74</sup> Steven Casey. *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pg. 34.

<sup>75</sup> {FDR's request to Lowell Mellet, July 18, 1941, OF 857, FDRL. First editions of the "Weekly Summary" in PSF (Subject): Mellet; and OF 1413. For reports from March 6 to July 10, 1942 see OF 788; for reports from July 24 to October 30, 1942, see OF 5015; all in FDRL. See also Winfield, *FDR and the Media*, pp. 80-81; Steele, "The pulse of the People," pp. 196-99.} As quoted in Steven Casey. *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 2001, pg. 17

<sup>76</sup> "FDR's Back-channel sources were figures like John Franklin Carter, a New Deal journalist and author, who headed a special intelligence-gathering unit for the president, and Morris L. Ernst, a prominent lawyer and civil libertarian, who gathered gossipy 'tidbits' from his informal parties with the prominent opinion makers and the reported them back to the White House. Both were colorful figures who strove to present their finding in a lively and engaging manner." Steven Casey. *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pg. 17.

<sup>77</sup> Steven Casey. *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pg. 17. The author of this monograph uses the following definitions to interpret Casey's work. The subtleties of differences in opinion often give hint of future shifts or trends in opinion as well as strength of the opinion. Color refers to the emotional response. Shade refers to an even more subtle level of emotive response. Hidden human dimension could refer to cultural or localized responses that might be overlooked without the personal interaction with the public through back channel networking FDR used. Understanding the strength of an opinion is an understanding of the measurement of changing opinion and potential for changing opinion.

<sup>78</sup> {John Franklin Carter, Oral History Interview, February 1, 1966, FDRL. Carter's reports in PSF (Subject): Carter, FDRL. Ernst's "Tidbits" in PSF (Subject): Ernst. For Background on Carter's operation see Berle to welles, January 20, 1941, State Department Subject File, 1938-45: J.F. Carter, Berle Papers; Smith to FDR, October 16, 1941, OF 4514, FDRL. See also, Steele, "Pulse of the People," pp.200-1; Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, pp.132-33' Block, ed., *Current Biography*, pp. 308-9; Casey, "Roosevelt and the 'S-Project,'" pp. 341-42.} as referenced in Steven Casey. *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

five to eight thousand letters a day.<sup>79</sup> Despite all his sensors to alert him to changes in public opinion, FDR searched for more. His actions could rarely be directly correlated to changes in public opinion. This lack of correlation could be because of the landscaping FDR did prior to a change in policy, or in his knowledge that public opinion was fickle and reactionary to successes or failures on the battlefield. The lack of direct correlation might also be because of FDR's suspicion that the opinions printed in the Opinion and Editorial (OP/ED) section of newspapers were not indicative of the population, but of the newspaper ownership. FDR was interested enough to closely monitor opinion, but wary enough not to trust the media or to follow the fluctuations in opinion too closely.

Roosevelt's attitudes toward media starkly reflected the division between the need of media to sell to the reader and to tell the reader what they ought to know. He felt the Hearst media companies, the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, and the *New York Daily News* were against the administration and served only to confuse the public mind. FDR thought he had more influence over the public mind than any newspaper editor did. Despite that, Roosevelt never did rid himself of the thought that perhaps the press' views did matter. He scoured the *New York Times*, *Herald Tribune*, the *Baltimore Sun*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Washington Post* and *Times Herald* each day with special attention paid to the editorial pages.<sup>80</sup>

Although Roosevelt increased his exposure to public opinion<sup>81</sup> polls in the late 1930s and continued to receive them throughout the remainder of his presidency, he distrusted them. The newer polls, such as the Gallup Poll claimed scientific measurement, but measuring opinion was not the same as measuring the number of people who listened to a fireside chat. He preferred *Fortune's* polling data to Gallup. He also used the Office of Public Opinion Research (OPOR) at Princeton University for opinion data. Hadley Cantrill of the OPOR became one of FDR's chief channels for gauging the mood of the

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<sup>79</sup> Steven Casey. *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pg. 17.

<sup>80</sup> {Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 206; Schlesinger, *Coming of the New Deal*, pp. 511-12. } As referenced in Steven Casey. *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pg. 17.

<sup>81</sup> Steven Casey. *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pg. xxii. Casey confines his definition of public opinion to what FDR considered it to be.

American People.<sup>82</sup> Once the OFF was established, Roosevelt began to rely upon their information to supplement the polling data. The Bureau of Intelligence within the OFF began to compile the Survey of Intelligence Materials, a comprehensive analysis of mass attitude.<sup>83</sup> FDR was extremely interested in this report and even requested back copies when there were any omissions from his files.<sup>84</sup> Even with a third election, rising popularity polls, and continued popular support for the war, the OWI could not escape the challenge of proving its worth and legitimacy.

As time went on, the agency did not live up to its promise to ferret out the news, the reporters sought and criticisms mounted. FDR was once receptive and accessible to the media, but as the war progressed, he became guarded.<sup>85</sup> The change in FDR's behavior with the press did not help the OWI's image or relationship with the media. As the primary SC voice withdrew, OWI tried to fill the void. However, the OWI was closely tied to the President because his public persona was so closely linked to all SC. This brought several in and outside of the government to question the independence and purpose of the OWI. Allen Winkler said, "The OWI was seen as the president's publicity bureau and unnecessary or unhelpful or both."<sup>86</sup> This perception led to a political move in Congress to remove the OWI by not funding many of its projects.<sup>87</sup> "In the face of all the antagonism, OWI found itself increasingly

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<sup>82</sup> {For FDR's desire to consult Cantril's polls, see Rowe to FDR, August 9, 1940, OF 463-C, FDRL; Niles to Grace Tully, November 11, 1942; FDR to Cantril, November 12, 1942; both in PPF 8229, FDRL. See also, Cantril, *The Human Dimension*, p. 35-43; Winfield, *FDR and the Media*, pp. 215-21; Steele, "Pulse of the People," pp. 205-13. Two years later, an FDR aide was still stressing that "the Princeton poll is much more sensible and accurate than Gallup of Roper"; see Rowe to Tully, October 8, 1942, PSF (Subject): EOP: Rowe, FDRL.} As referenced in Steven Casey, *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

<sup>83</sup> {For the techniques used in compiling these reports see OFF, "SolM" No. 23, May 13, 1942, PSF (Subject): OWI, FDRL; and Barth, "The Bureau of Intelligence," pp. 66-76.} As referenced in Steven Casey, *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

<sup>84</sup> Steven Casey, *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pgs. 18-19. "Under Davis the agency and its propaganda changed in time to become more closely attuned to the real American aims in the war." {Eisenhower, *The President is Calling*, p. 128; Brock, "Uncle Sam Hires a Reporter," p. 8.} As quoted in Allen M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 38.

<sup>85</sup> Allen M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 53.

<sup>86</sup> Allen M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 53.

<sup>87</sup> The republicans and southern democrats supported a full military victory, but became increasingly intolerant of other Roosevelt administration programs. The Office of War Information became involved in the conservative effort to dismantle the liberal framework Roosevelt had created. Republicans in particular claimed that the OWI made postwar commitments that could not be fulfilled and it was more a publicity center for the New Deal and a

constrained. As a result, they gave more and more of their attention to programs, already underway, aimed at generating support for the war.”<sup>88</sup> The irony is that an agency tasked with image creation and communication would suffer from a lack of self-promotion and meet its demise because of that failure. Propaganda once flourished and then withered.

American propaganda reached maturity after a long, hard fight in World War II. And, with maturity, the inflated expectations of the prewar period gave way to more realistic assessments of what propaganda might do. The public fear of the insidious lure of propaganda was now laid to rest, as was the early hope that propaganda could play the decisive role in winning the war. In the end the radio, leaflet, and film campaigns of OWI and other organizations played a useful part in the struggle, but always in conjunction with a host of other weapons that were equally if not more important. Although President Truman cited OWI for an “outstanding contribution to victory” as he abolished the wartime agency by executive order on 31 August 1945, he and others both in and out of the agency, now had a clearer idea of the contributions propaganda could make.<sup>89</sup>

Ultimately, propaganda proved to be a useful tool during WWII. However, it was not as powerful as some had hoped. Propaganda served to control eruptions of public dissent and to set the commonly held belief that this was a “good war.”<sup>90</sup> Fighting the “good war” were Americans overseas and at home. Americans believed they would be victorious and that they were playing an important role in ensuring victory. Key to this participation was that the public was asked to participate and contribute. These actions solidified the public’s commitment to the cause and thus perpetuated public support. Those sentiments and the acceptance of changes in lifestyle and culture were due largely in part to the strategic communication campaign, of which the OWI played a significant role in providing information to the American public.

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fourth term for Roosevelt. { Burlingame, *Don't Let Them Scare You*, p. 218; Christian Science Monitor, 28 April 1943. } Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 65.

<sup>88</sup> Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 53-54.

<sup>89</sup> { *New York Times*, 1 September 1945; Executive Order 9608, Providing for the Termination of the Office of War Information, and for the Disposition of Its Functions and of Certain Functions of the Office of Inter-American Affairs, 31 August 1945, *Federal Register* 10, no. 173 (1 September 1945), p. 11223. } As referenced in Allen M. Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 149.

<sup>90</sup> Steven Casey. *Cautious Crusade*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pg. xviii.

## Section 6: Legal and Regulatory Limitations on Public Affairs

Restrictions on the use of propaganda continue to be placed to protect the American Public from the evil uses of propaganda. “On May 22, 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives passed an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2009 that “would make permanent a domestic propaganda ban that until now has been enacted annually in the military authorization bill.”<sup>91</sup> If this bill were to become law, it would remove most of the ambiguity found in the current legislative restraint on propaganda used by the USG on domestic audiences, the Smith-Mundt Act.

Information Operations (IO) might contain propaganda directed toward foreign audiences, but by law, (US Code 22, Smith-Mundt Act), messages sent to foreign audiences cannot be sent to domestic audiences. Therefore, IO including psychological operations and propaganda cannot be directed toward a domestic audience. This is in part the basis for military PA doctrine adamantly stating that they will only send accurate messages, meant to inform and not to sway the American public. Persuasion can be very subtle and might contain bias. However, persuasion is accepted in American culture as long as it does not cross the line into propaganda. It might very well be that in directing the military message to the American Public, the PAO might persuade just through the institutional bias in telling their story. Detecting that bias is a skill of critical thinking, Paul and Elder claim most Americans lack.<sup>92</sup> This lack of critical thinking could make persuasion and biased reporting just as dangerous as propaganda. PAOs are right to be vigilant against bias, however, their vigilance may complicate their efforts to garner public support.

People, such as Michael Waller<sup>93</sup>, believe that the Smith-Mundt Act is a shield behind which PA hides. Many of these same people believe that the Act applies only to the Department of State (DoS).

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<sup>91</sup> David Barstow, “2 Inquiries Set on Pentagon Publicity Effort,” *New York Times*, May 24, 2008. “the Senate is still working on its version of the bill.” The bill, which was sponsored by Representative Paul Hodes, would also require the Defense Department Inspector General and GAO to investigate the program.” Source Watch. “Pentagon Military Analyst Program.” *Source Watch: A project of the Center for Media and Democracy*. APR 2008. [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Pentagon\\_military\\_analyst\\_program](http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Pentagon_military_analyst_program) (accessed MAR 12, 2009).

<sup>92</sup> Richard Paul and Linda Elder. “The Thinker’s Guide.” *For Conscientious Citizens on How to Detect Media Bias & Propaganda in National and World News*. (Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2006).

<sup>93</sup> See Appendix: Counter Smith-Mundt Act, for Mr. Waller’s argument against the Smith-Mundt Act.

Some attempts to circumvent the Act have succeeded but the risk in doing so could undermine credibility. Many, like Mr. Waller, have called for a legal review of the act to clarify application of the act to embolden the PAOs to strengthen the Center of Gravity (COG) for public Support and to protect the COG from enemy IO.<sup>94</sup>

But until such time as a legal review of the Smith-Mundt Act, the passage of a permanent ban on domestic use of propaganda, or a declaration of war (allowing the suspension of 1<sup>st</sup> amendment rights, allowing censorship), the military will continue to err on the conservative side and thus protect its honor and credibility. As Donald Wright and Timothy Reese report, “Propaganda or publicity designed to sway or direct public opinion will not be included in Department of Defense PA programs.”<sup>95</sup> This conservative behavior is in keeping with the military’s interest, culture and values.

The DoD had some missteps in retaining high credibility with its public, but after the initial approval of the Bush Administration, the missteps of the administration began a long tumble toward lack of confidence, trust and credibility for the administration. Credibility for the Bush Administration was further damaged by violating laws against propaganda and serves as further warning to act conservatively in areas of persuasion. US Code Title 5 States that the executive branch cannot use funds to pay for propaganda unless specifically appropriated. The challenge then becomes that the president has to rely on the media to communicate his agenda to the public. In 2005, there were three violations attributed to the Bush administration, which brought the use of taxpayer dollars for propaganda to the front page.<sup>96</sup> Then in APR 2008, the Pentagon was accused of using propaganda toward the American public through the

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<sup>94</sup> J. Michael Waller. "Chapter 1: War Time Message-Making: An Immediate-Term Approach." In *Fighting the War of Idea like a Real War: Messages to Defeat the Terrorists*, by J. Michael Waller, 1-86. (Washington, DC: The Institute Of World Politics Press, 2007)., pg. 20

<sup>95</sup> Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese. *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign*. (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), pg. 289.

<sup>96</sup> Bill Van Auken. "Bush administration defends use of covert propaganda in US." *World Socialist Web Site*. MAR 17, 2005. <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/mar2005/prop-m17.shtml> (accessed APR 15, 2009). In response to the scandal of the violation of USC 5, President Bush said in a press conference that the departments would have to realize that the administration’s agenda would have to stand on its own two feet. He also then humorously said to the press, “you will help us in reporting our agenda won’t you.”

access the pentagon gave to retired generals serving as military advisors to news networks.<sup>97</sup> This propaganda scandal was made even more egregious by the fact that many of the military analysts were also on the payrolls of organizations who stood to profit from the Bush Administration policy toward the GWOT. The Pentagon was implicated in giving information and talking points to these military advisors to be repeated in their analytical discourse during their news segments. The argument was that this access to information tainted the independence of the analyst and made the news channel part of the platform for the Pentagon's initiatives rather than giving an unbiased analysis of the Pentagon's actions. Out of this came two bills on in the House and one in the Senate that proposed to define Propaganda, and impose strict penalties for government employees who engaged in the propaganda activities. Both bills died in committee.<sup>98</sup>

While Franklin D. Roosevelt and George W. Bush were both president during an attack on American soil, their actions immediately following the attacks set up two very different operating environments. FDR asked Congress to declare war. Bush used the war powers act to send troops into battle and proclaimed a war on terror, but did not ask Congress to declare war. The practicalities of declaring a war on a non-state actor is beyond the scope of this paper, and the discussion does not change the current operating environment (COE). Declaring the persistent conflict to be a "war", however, is relevant in that without a declaration of war, the SC COE is vastly different and more restrictive than the SC COE of WWII. These restrictions, (Smith-Mundt Act, American values of free press, American disdain for propaganda, military regulations) make SC far more difficult. These restrictions also make control of the message more difficult. In an attempt to gain control, the Bush Administration put its credibility on the line by yet again running counter to American sensibilities and values.

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<sup>97</sup> Source Watch. "Pentagon Military Analyst Program." *Source Watch: A project of the Center for Media and Democracy*. APR 2008. [http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Pentagon\\_military\\_analyst\\_program](http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Pentagon_military_analyst_program) (accessed MAR 12, 2009)

<sup>98</sup> Congressional Record. *A Bill to Stop Taxpayer Funded Government Proaganda*. FEB 2, 2005. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2005/s020205.html> (accessed SEP 24, 2008). Congressional Record. *Open Congress*. <http://www.opencongress.org/bill/109-h373/text> (accessed SEP 24, 2008).



President Bush and Congress, in the first reactions to shock and fear of an attack on our soil passed the *Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001* (Public Law Pub.L. 107-56), commonly referred to as the Patriot Act. Under this act, several constitutional rights were suspended to aid in the search and identification of terrorists within our own borders. The effects of this repeal of protections and rights has gone as far as charges of treason resulting from the monitoring of journalists writings to scan for classified information or information which might aid the enemy. One case in particular highlights the issue of hyper-hysteria at one end of the scale and intense wartime security measures at the other end of the scale. The *New York Times* broke the story of the National Security Agency's (NSA) warrantless wiretaps and other electronic surveillance, which specifically targeted the media and journalists. A 1950 amendment to the Espionage act of 1917 says that "whoever knowingly and willfully...publishes...any classified information...concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States...shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both."<sup>99</sup> The Justice Department says that this is what they might use to prosecute the *New York Times* editor and reporters for disclosure of the warrantless surveillance by the NSA.<sup>100</sup> On 8 August 2008, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) apologized for a recently uncovered breach of two more New York Times reporter's phone records in the course of a national security investigation nearly four years prior. The procedure used to procure these phone records is known as the exigent circumstances letter. The FBI along with their apology stated that they had removed the phone records from their databases. National security letters are another way of obtaining phone, financial and other records from third party businesses to advance terrorism investigations. The bureau has been chastised for overreaching and for failing to back up the secret requests, which reached 60,000 per year after the 2001 attacks.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Jacib Sullum. "Treat Reporters like Spies?" *washingtontimes.com*. MAY 29, 2006.  
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/may/20060529-110134-9197r/print/> (accessed JAN 27, 2009).

<sup>100</sup> Jacib Sullum. "Treat Reporters like Spies?" *washingtontimes.com*. MAY 29, 2006.  
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/may/20060529-110134-9197r/print/> (accessed JAN 27, 2009).

<sup>101</sup> Carrie Johnson. "FBI Apologizes to Post, Times: Phone Records Were Breached." *Washington Post.com*, (AUG 9, 2008): A04.

The backdrop of fear and action is that which set the stage for the SC during the Bush Administration years after 11 SEP 2001. Some of the SC actions were successful. DoD, through its conservative stance on persuasion and a new transparency, DoD managed to maintain its credibility with the American Public. In 2003, TIME magazine proved the American support from the military was strong by voting to make the American Soldier, their person of the year.<sup>102</sup> At the end of Bush's second term, when his approval rating was in the mid twenties, the Congressional approval rating was in the low teens, DoD's approval rating was above 70%, the highest of all government agencies.<sup>103</sup> This was very different from Vietnam era when the suspicions of the press were that the military was lying to the American Public during the Vietnam War. The embedded media program helped achieve this high level of trust between the US Military, Americans and the media. Tori Clark, former pentagon spokesperson, says that in this no-spin era, transparency is the key to good relations between Americans and their military.

The war in Iraq began with this strategic communication from President George W. Bush on 17 MAR 2003. "All the decades of deceit and cruelty have now reached an end. Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within forty-eight hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing."<sup>104</sup> This verbal communication was preceded by the strategic communication of action by the military buildup in Doha, Qatar. From the time of this pronouncement, President Bush found himself in a war of ideas in Iraq. Given the explosion of technology, cultural shifts<sup>105</sup> and the need for transparency, Bush was denied the opportunity enjoyed by Roosevelt to be the primary communicator of purpose during the Iraq war.

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<sup>102</sup> Nancy Gibbs. "U.S. Person of the Year." *Time Magazine On Line*. DEC 29, 2003.

<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1006533,00.html> (accessed MAR 15, 2009).

<sup>103</sup> Gallup Poll. *Gallup: Politics and Government: In U.S., Military Ranks Best, Congress Worst*. JUN 20, 2008.

<http://www.gallup.com/video/108130/US-Military-Ranks-Best-Congress-Worst.aspx> (accessed NOV 11, 2008).

Approval Rating of Congress hit an all time low in June 2008 at 12%, the lowest in Gallup Poll history and the US Military confidence rating in the same Gallup poll was 71%. In the same poll, the Presidency had a 26% confidence rating and the Supreme Court had a 32% Confidence rating, also the lowest confidence rating in the Supreme Court since the 1973 when confidence in institutions appeared in the Gallup Polling.

<sup>104</sup> Clark, Victoria, *Lipstick on a Pig*. New York: Free Press, 2006, pg. 65

<sup>105</sup> "But, Iraq would require a level of transparency and unconventional thinking unseen at the Pentagon in years. As we headed into a potential war with Iraq, it was no secret that public opinion was not nearly as strong as it had been

Transparency extended to communications with the military as well. General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the prep and execution of the invasion of Iraq, “would regularly spend thirty to sixty minutes once or twice a week before the Pentagon press corps.”<sup>106</sup> His purpose was to “communicate as consistently and clearly as possible to the American people and publics worldwide on significant national security issues and events.”<sup>107</sup> Transparency was a cornerstone to the communications plan. Rumsfeld had simple guidelines in dealing with the press, which are universal for those who deal with the press. He divided information into three categories: “I know and will tell you. I know and I can’t tell you. I don’t know.”<sup>108</sup> Part of the transparency the Pentagon worked to maintain was to record all senior officials’ interviews and public events, transcribe them and post them on the DoD website. An aspect of this practice provided the whole story and the whole interview in context, since most interviews are clipped due to time and space allocated by the editors.<sup>109</sup> However, one program outshone all the others in DoD’s efforts of transparency

Perhaps the best-known and most successful PA innovation during OIF was the embedding process. Embedding reporters with the military has its modern origins in the Crimean War. The interactions between the media and the military has swung back and forth from adversarial to cooperative, with a recent trend toward much greater cooperation. In the Civil War, despite censorship, reporters on both sides of the war used new technology, such as the camera and telegraph, reported from the front in mind-blowing speed “from the front.”<sup>110</sup>

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when we went into Afghanistan. You cannot have successful ongoing military operations without public support.” Clark, Victoria, *Lipstick on a Pig*. New York: Free Press, 2006, pg. 58.

<sup>106</sup> Victoria Clark. *Lipstick on a Pig*. (New York: Free Press, 2006), pg. 58.

<sup>107</sup> Victoria Clark. *Lipstick on a Pig*. (New York: Free Press, 2006), pg. 58.

<sup>108</sup> Victoria Clark. *Lipstick on a Pig*. (New York: Free Press, 2006), pg. 58.

<sup>109</sup> Victoria Clark. *Lipstick on a Pig*. (New York: Free Press, 2006), pg. 61.

<sup>110</sup> Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese. *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign*. (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), pg. 290-292. WWI the Brits banned reporters from the war zone. The Americans inducted reporters into the US Military in both WWI and WWII. Americans again imposed censorship in the world wars. The military media relationship turned hostile during the Vietnam war. The US government did not impose censorship and gave almost unrestricted access to the media. The media’s use of new technology, Television, brought the war into the living rooms of most Americans to report directly to the public. “This experience profoundly affected both the media and the military.” The media was often blamed for undermining the war effort. “conflict shaped official policy in the decades following the Vietnam war. The government prevented all media access to the 1983 invasion of Grenada, without much public outcry. In response to the media outrage, a military

When asked why the military changed their policy on media coverage from the first gulf war to the second gulf war, Torie Clark replied, “Because in 1991 the Americans were universally recognized as the good guys; not so in 2003, when world opinion was hostile and certainly would have been skeptical of information that came through the U.S. Government.”<sup>111</sup> The New York Times’ David Carr said in late March, “A new standard of openness and immediacy has been created for war coverage, raising the question of whether reporters, soldiers, or news consumers will ever be satisfied with less.”<sup>112</sup> Clark told 60 minutes that in watching the war live, the American public was getting no-spin on the war. They were getting it as it happened without analysis or interpretation. This was true transparency.<sup>113</sup> Torie Clark claims that instead of keeping reporters out of Abu Ghraib prison, that she would have preferred that it be crawling with them, because the presence of reporters would have deterred the actions of the guards. “Embedding was real-time accountability, faster stronger and more visible than any court-martial or congressional investigation.”<sup>114</sup>

Embedding the media had a few problems. The first night of the ground action in MAR 2003, GEN Tommy Franks told Torie Clark that assessments and unit positions had been reported that should not have. Torie Clark made the case, and GEN Franks realizing the importance of the embed program

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commission created the idea of the press pool. The press pool was used in the invasion of Panama (8 journalists) and Desert Shield Desert Storm (1500 journalists). This was a very controlled environment which allowed selected members of the media to travel to the war zone and then share the information across the pool.” Thus, media access was greatly improved. There was one serious unintended consequence in using the press pool. While the US Army protected its MILDEC operation of a faint of an amphibious assault as the ME, the real ME came from the land in a sweeping attack around the main Iraqi defenses in Kuwait. The pool was restricted to covering certain units and many officers felt that the efforts of the soldiers in the ME was not adequately covered. Live media coverage debuted in DS/DS with the new technology of satellite coverage. The media could now report the war without assistance or monitoring from the US military. This, however, meant that the Military PAOs had to be competitive to get their story out to the American Public. As the information age was ushered in, the national element of power – information became increasingly important. In Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts the press was embedded with units to live with the units and cover their daily lives as well and the combat they faced. OPSEC became a big concern with the military and for the most part, the media was responsive to the need of keeping operations information secret until after the fact to protect the lives of the US Military. “[In planning for OIF, the military] understood the importance of news coverage in supporting military objectives, and believed that providing the media easy access to military units during operations was the proper approach.”

<sup>111</sup> Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb. *The Media and the War on Terrorism*. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), pg. 12.

<sup>112</sup> Victoria Clark. *Lipstick on a Pig*. (New York: Free Press, 2006), pg. 71.

<sup>113</sup> Victoria Clark. *Lipstick on a Pig*. (New York: Free Press, 2006), pg. 71-72.

<sup>114</sup> Victoria Clark. *Lipstick on a Pig*. (New York: Free Press, 2006), pg. 77.

continued it.<sup>115</sup> “The overwhelming majority of embedded journalists acted professionally and responsibly throughout the conflict.”<sup>116</sup> The volume of coverage was surprising. A USA Today editorial on 27 MAR 2003 said: “Vietnam was the first ‘living-room war,’ But Iraq is the first was reported to home audiences in real time.”<sup>117</sup>

To a very large extent, embedding did achieve our objectives. A few days into the war, a front-page photo in the New York Times showed Iraqi soldiers dressed as civilians, clear violation of the Geneva Conventions. Showing the photo to Secretary Rumsfeld, [Torie Clark] said, ‘We could have said a thousand times that the Iraqi regime was dressing its soldiers as civilians to ambush coalition forces. Some people would have believed us; others wouldn’t.’ It was a clear win to have the international news media report Saddam’s atrocities.<sup>118</sup>

Embedded reporting gave the American public a close and uncensored look at the realities of combat, the extraordinary service members in action, and secured a respectful relationship between the public and their forces. This social interaction between DoD and the American public is a culmination of mutual influence. Societal norms and values govern the military’s actions and are reflected in military regulations and standard operating procedures. Likewise, the international influence of America is increasingly done with our military as the face of American foreign policy.

## **Social Influence**

Propaganda is a short cut to influence with short term results. Over time, the USG has shown that a longer sighted and softer approach can be more effective and more accepted even in times of international conflict. The US Information Agency (USIA) was a long-term<sup>119</sup> program, which demonstrated these results before budget cuts under the Clinton administration dramatically cut the cultural exchange programs and placed USIA under DoS Public Diplomacy as the Bureau of Educational

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<sup>115</sup> Victoria Clark. *Lipstick on a Pig*. (New York: Free Press, 2006), pg. 67-71.

<sup>116</sup> Victoria Clark. *Lipstick on a Pig*. (New York: Free Press, 2006), pg. 69.

<sup>117</sup> Victoria Clark. *Lipstick on a Pig*. (New York: Free Press, 2006), pg. 70.

<sup>118</sup> Victoria Clark. *Lipstick on a Pig*. (New York: Free Press, 2006), pg.73.

<sup>119</sup> Joseph S. Nye. *Soft power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 99. “Moreover, soft-power resources often work indirectly by shaping the environment for policy, and sometimes takes years to produce desired outcomes.”

and Cultural Affairs.<sup>120</sup> The United States seeks to influence through attractions as opposed to coercion. Propaganda plays on prejudices and emotions. Soft power can attract by invoking hate, fear and insecurity.<sup>121</sup>

During Desert Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS),<sup>122</sup> the United States Government (USG) adopted a strategy to strengthen support for the war by reducing expectations, inoculating the public to possible negative events, and providing a “troops-eye-view” of the war via Hometown News Program<sup>123</sup>. Dr. Pratkanis urges “A social influence analysis (SIA) approach [because it] appreciates the competitive and often brutal nature of the use of influence in conflict.”<sup>124</sup> During his sabbatical from University of Southern California, Santa Cruz, Dr. Pratkanis studied public diplomacy at the Naval Post-Graduate School and found that “in the US Civil War, both world wars and the cold war, the course of war is no

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<sup>120</sup> Public Diplomacy.org. "Consolidation of Public Diplomacy Programs into the Department of State ." *publicdiplomacy.org*. SEP 27, 2003. <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/6.htm> (accessed APR 15, 2009)

<sup>121</sup> Attraction can be in the eye of the beholder; Nye's attractive force of soft power no doubt appeals to “your poor, your tired, your huddled masses longing to be free” whereas the propaganda of hatred and fear appeals to those who seek power. {For details see Jarol B. Mannheim. *Strategic public diplomacy and American foreign policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994)} as quoted in Anthony R. Pratkanis. "The Use of Influence in Public Diplomacy Before, During and After an International Conflict: A Social Influence Analysis." In *Hand Book of Public Diplomacy*, by Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor. (New York: Routledge, 2008)

<sup>122</sup> Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese. *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign*. (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), pg 291-292. The media was often blamed for undermining the war effort during Vietnam. “ conflict shaped official policy in the decades following the Vietnam war. The government prevented all media access to the 1983 invasion of Grenada, without much public outcry. In response to the media outrage, a military commission created the idea of the press pool. The press pool was used in the invasion of Panama (8 journalists) and Desert Shield Desert Storm (1500 journalists). This was a very controlled environment which allowed selected members of the media to travel to the war zone and then share the information across the pool.” Thus, media access was greatly improved. There was one serious unintended consequence in using the press pool. While the US Army protected its MILDEC operation of a faint of an amphibious assault as the ME, the real ME came from the land in a sweeping attack around the main Iraqi defenses in Kuwait. The pool was restricted to covering certain units and many officers felt that the efforts of the soldiers in the ME was not adequately covered. Live media coverage debuted in DS/DS with the new technology of satellite coverage. The media could now report the war without assistance or monitoring from the US military. This, however, meant that the Military PAOs had to be competitive to get their story out to the American Public. As the information age was ushered in, the national element of power – information became increasingly important. In Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts the press was embedded with units to live with the units and cover their daily lives as well and the combat they faced. OPSEC became a big concern with the military and for the most part, the media was responsive to the need of keeping operations information secret until after the fact to protect the lives of the US Military. “[In planning for OIF, the military] understood the importance of news coverage in supporting military objectives, and believed that providing the media easy access to military units during operations was the proper approach.”

<sup>123</sup> Headquarters Department of the Army. "DA Pamphlet 360-3." *Army Hometown News Program*. Washington, D.C.: Training and Doctrine Command, AUG 1, 1984, pg. 1-24.

<sup>124</sup> Anthony R. Pratkanis. "The Use of Influence in Public Diplomacy Before, During and After an International Conflict: A Social Influence Analysis." In *Hand Book of Public Diplomacy*, by Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor. (New York: Routledge, 2008), pg. 4.

longer determined by a rational calculus of interests of the elite rulers but the prejudices and emotions of everyday people.”<sup>125</sup> Thus, he identifies the public’s will and support as a COG in public diplomacy. As an expert on propaganda and author of *The Age of Propaganda*, Dr. Pratkanis looked at influencing the public through propaganda, persuasion, advertising, public relations and social influence. Since America’s COG is the will of its people, it follows that the will of the people is a primary target for America’s enemies.<sup>126</sup> Targeting public opinion is done effectively through IO and specifically through propaganda. Partkanis states: “Mere communication in the hopes of understanding is just not adequate to counter the propaganda of authoritarians and ethnic hate mongers; opposing such propaganda requires the efforts of an effective influence campaign.”<sup>127</sup> Counter-propaganda is a critical function of PA. Counter-propaganda is perhaps one of the areas for greatest improvement at both DoD and USG levels. One of the largest missteps in counter-propaganda may have been the failure to continue to treat terrorism as a crime. By escalating American rhetoric to calling for a “war on terror”, America validated the terrorists’ rhetoric of Jihad. If America had termed terrorism a ‘crime’ or “Hirabah,”<sup>128</sup> Arab or Islamic Law enforcement agencies may have been forced to bring the terrorists to justice under Shia Law rather than force Islamic authorities to support a holy war.

In an effort to remove strength and power from the enemy through IE, it is necessary to show their actions and philosophy as illegitimate and faulty. By discrediting the enemy, we seek to reduce support for his actions and thus the enemy’s ability to sustain the fight. Part of the support for terrorist in our current conflict is from dominate religious clerics, and key to their support is the notion of a holy war which is blessed by God, according to the Koran. In perpetuating their way of life and preservation of the

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<sup>125</sup> Anthony R. Pratkanis. "The Use of Influence in Public Diplomacy Before, During and After an International Conflict: A Social Influence Analysis." In *Hand Book of Public Diplomacy*, by Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor. (New York: Routledge, 2008), pg. 5.

<sup>126</sup> “The enemy’s delivery system channels images and messages into the eyes and ears of the world public and especially those who make and shape opinion and policy. The enemy monitors American public opinion closely. Osama bin Laden explained this directly, addressing the American public in a recording aired through Aljazeera in January, 2006. J. Michael Waller. "Chapter 3: Making Jihad work for America." In *Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War*, by J. Michael Waller. (Washington, DC: The Institute Of World Politics Press, 2007).

<sup>127</sup> Anthony R. Pratkanis. "The Use of Influence in Public Diplomacy Before, During and After an International Conflict: A Social Influence Analysis." In *Hand Book of Public Diplomacy*, by Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor. (New York: Routledge, 2008), pg. 6.

<sup>128</sup> See Appendix: Hirabah vs, Jihad

power, clerics could not act against any movement defined as a holy war. A change in American rhetoric away from the rhetoric of the terrorists' jihad should be made so as not to hinder Muslims in the recovery of their own ideas. The more appropriate and accurate term for the attacks on 11 SEP 2001, is Hirabah. The word is already in the Arabic language and describes Islamic terror. This crime has been tried for over a thousand years in Islamic judicial systems. Use of this word to describe the crimes of the terrorists would have given the Islamic nations, governments, clerics and populations the responsibility for taking responsibility for the criminals and their actions, thus making America's entry into the current and persistent conflict less likely, and perhaps unnecessary. A lack of cultural understanding and the impact of words upon a culture was a misstep America needs to remedy.<sup>129</sup>

Cultural understanding is handled in more depth in other papers, but this SC misstep highlights that taking the longer view of sustained social influence is a valid and necessary measure in counter-propaganda. Perhaps the time to correct America's misuse of the rhetoric 'Jihad' has opened with a new presidential administration. President Obama has ceased to refer to the current conflict as the Global War on Terror, because it too was a SC miscommunication. If he were to correctly, label the actions of the terrorists as crimes and use the Arabic word for crime, the question is would it change international perception? The first 100 days of the Obama administration has closed so it is most likely that a new window in which to correctly call these crimes, Hirabah will have to open with a new catalyst. One such catalyst may be opening the opportunity now. As DoD closes Guantanamo Bay and has to move the detainees to other American facilities, the rights afforded to all prisoners may now have to be applied and they might be charged with a crime. Perhaps charging the detainees with 'Hirabah' and allowing them to be tried under Shia Law<sup>130</sup> in an international court would lead the world to see the actions of terrorists as

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<sup>129</sup> Please see appendix for direct quote from J. Michael Waller's book, Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War for more information on Hiraba vs. Jihad. The remedies America might use to remedy our lack of cultural understand of other cultures is a topic for other papers, however, one program that worked well in the past is the USIA programs of outreach. The desire to become culturally aware may become a necessity if the American hegemony is failing as some report. The failure of an American Hegemony is also beyond the scope of this paper.

<sup>130</sup> Shia Law is Islamic law which is based in the religious teachings in the Koran. While the author is not suggesting the Shia law replace the westernized law currently used in International courts, the potential for setting a precedent must be avoided. Avoiding the setting of precedent might come in allowing each defendant to be tried by the laws of their homeland with an international court monitoring the proceedings. It would be hard for a defendant



crimes and cause the home nations of terrorists to take action themselves to control the violent extremist movements. Although this line of thought leaves the scope of this paper, it is worth trying to find the opportunity to correctly communicate to the American Public and the world, so that justice may be done under the appropriate conditions. Setting the stage for democracy, or at least exposing other cultures to democratic ideas, was the social influence USIA sent around the world. The benefit of USIA exchange programs gave America cultural awareness worldwide in return.

Setting the stage in persuasion is what Pratkanis calls landscaping. Landscaping is also pre-persuasion. According to Dr. Pratkanis, “FDR used landscaping through his four freedoms speech to set-post war decision criteria.”<sup>131</sup> Another term Pratkanis uses in explaining social influence is Altercasting. “Altercasting refers to creating a relationship with the target of influence.” Currently we attempt to achieve Public Diplomacy by applying the models of advertising and public relations.

The first model is advertising. Advertising tends to be ineffective because it often focuses on a niche market, rather than widespread audiences. It has a long lead-time and it is not reactive enough. As well, it is often seen as disingenuous or too positive or one sided or as propaganda, which leads to failure in the use of advertising as public diplomacy in international conflict. One exception is when a containment strategy is employed, which divides the world up into spheres of interests or segments. Two-sided ads can be effective if the target is well informed, can process complex ideas and is mildly opposed to the message. The philosophy of branding ignores the dynamic, competitive nature of international conflict.”<sup>132</sup>

The second model is Public Affairs. “Public relations consist of a set of techniques designed to raise awareness of an issue or entity and to create a favorable impression of that entity or issue.” This is

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to argue against being tried by his home laws, particularly in the case above where the rejection of Shia law would be a rejection of one’s religion as well. The author is not a lawyer, nor does the author claim to know international law or the international court system. These are ideas that warrant further study.

<sup>131</sup> Anthony R. Pratkanis. "The Use of Influence in Public Diplomacy Before, During and After an International Conflict: A Social Influence Analysis." In *Hand Book of Public Diplomacy*, by Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor. (New York: Routledge, 2008), pg. 8.

<sup>132</sup> Anthony R. Pratkanis. "The Use of Influence in Public Diplomacy Before, During and After an International Conflict: A Social Influence Analysis." In *Hand Book of Public Diplomacy*, by Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor. (New York: Routledge, 2008), pg. 9-14.

done primarily through creation and dissemination of images and visuals and the establishment and use of relationships and networks to shape a story. A Public Relations approach is inadequate at best for use in an international conflict. The Creel Commission was the first wholesale use of PR to sell a conflict. PR is most effective when: 1) the cause is little known when the images created and disseminated are accepted with little scrutiny, 2) reduced visibility campaign precedes PR, 3) its images are stronger or do not compete with new negative images, and 4) the PR technique is not detected. Dr. Pratkanis states, “PR can be effective in creating visual images and in using social relationships to control mass media agendas...as long as the public is not thinking much about those images and is in a non-adversarial situation. Counter Images can lead to an erosion of trust.”<sup>133</sup>

Dr Pratkanis purports that there are only three ways to change human beliefs and behavior: outright deception, raw power or control of critical resources, and social influence. Social influence is the only means of attaining legitimacy, which is needed to employ power or control. Social influence, according to Dr. Pratkanis, is “any non-coercive technique, device, procedure, or manipulation that relies on the social psychological nature or behavior of the target.”<sup>134</sup> Also, Pratkanis relates, “Social influence uses tactics that appeal to our human nature to secure compliance, obedience, helping, and behavior and attitude change. Social influence can use propaganda and other forms of persuasion such as debate, discussion, argument, and well-crafted speeches.”<sup>135</sup> Social influence tailored to meet the restrictions on the SC COE is the way ahead in garnering domestic as well as international support of US military actions during conflict.

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<sup>133</sup> Anthony R. Pratkanis. "The Use of Influence in Public Diplomacy Before, During and After an International Conflict: A Social Influence Analysis." In *Hand Book of Public Diplomacy*, by Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor. (New York: Routledge, 2008), pg 14-18.

<sup>134</sup> Anthony R. Pratkanis. "The Use of Influence in Public Diplomacy Before, During and After an International Conflict: A Social Influence Analysis." In *Hand Book of Public Diplomacy*, by Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor. (New York: Routledge, 2008), pg 37.

<sup>135</sup> Anthony R. Pratkanis. "The Use of Influence in Public Diplomacy Before, During and After an International Conflict: A Social Influence Analysis." In *Hand Book of Public Diplomacy*, by Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor. (New York: Routledge, 2008), pg. 20.

## Section 7: Conclusion

### Relevant Lessons Learned

Though the OWI faced challenges, they had some successes and lessons to pass on. The lessons to learn from their success in garnering domestic support are numerous. Yet, most center on controlling the formulation, dissemination and quality of the message. In order to achieve such aims one must send messages through all mediums available to reach the audience,<sup>136</sup> own up to mistakes quickly<sup>137</sup> monitor public opinion and test market campaigns for effectiveness, tailor written and visual products to the latest formatted<sup>138</sup> for quick consumption, appeal to logic and emotion while providing factual information, and

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<sup>136</sup> “Today, the struggle for information superiority takes place across many networks and in multiple domains. It impacts things as widely different as platforms in space, personal data assistants (known as PDAs), and the six o’clock news. It uses weapons that depend on advanced information technology for their devastating effectiveness, and it uses crude slogans and graffiti. U.S. forces have become the most sophisticated and powerful in the world by integrating information technology. Nonetheless, that very sophistication can make U.S. forces vulnerable to exploitation by an adversary. Exploitation ranges from sophisticated computer network attacks fully backed by a hostile power to an asymmetric blend of fanaticism, cell phones, garage door openers, messengers, and high-yield explosives. To counter these threats and focus on various audiences, commanders understand, visualize, describe, and direct efforts that contribute to information superiority.” Headquarters Department of the Army. *FM 3-0 Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Training and Doctrine Command, 27 FEB 2008, pg. 7-2.

<sup>137</sup> “The question of news release became the first source of serious contention. Davis felt that his and the OWI’s mission was to truthfully inform the American Public. He felt with some truth, that the military services were unnecessarily hiding their losses and had not considered the need to keep the public informed. Davis ran headlong into resistance, which he under anticipated. The State Department, Davis said, ‘cooperated with OWI only when and insofar as it chose.’”{ Hull to Davis, 8 July 1942, Box 5, Records of OWI; Davis to Hull, 10 July 1942, Box 5, Records of OWI; “Report of Elmer Davis,” p. 237 } As quoted in Allen M.Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 47 “On OCT 13, 1942, the Navy worked to clear a backlog of sinkings two months after the fact, the criticisms grew only sharper when these were quickly followed by news of a victory at Cape Esperance. “The public suspected, based on past experience that the bad news was reserved until there was good news with which to balance it.” Allen M.Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978)., pg.50. “In another similar event, ADM King wanted to withhold news of a sinking a few days until after the elections were over. Davis convinced him that this was unwise and that it would result in charges of playing politics.”{ Davis, Lecture -- Role of Information in World War II, 16 November 1951, pp. 26-28, Davis Papers; Burlingame, *Don’t Let Them Scare You*, p. 202; Lauterbach, “Elmer Davis and the News,” p. 55.} As quoted in Allen M.Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 50.

<sup>138</sup> Allen M.Winkler. *The Politics of Propaganda The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pg. 38-40. Gardner Cowles, Jr., a moderate Midwestern newspaper publisher, became the director of the Domestic Branch. Cowles was not one of the more outspoken leaders of the OWI. He was Harvard educated, and returned home to Iowa to begin his career in the newspaper and radio industries. He and his brother established the popular interest magazine called, Look. He was one of the earliest users of Gallup polls, using them to adjust the format of the magazine to his reader’s tastes. Both MacLeish and Sherwood believed that the American Public was rational and reasonable and with the proper evidence at hand would make informed decisions. Cowles argued that, “the public, generally speaking, won’t read long columns of type in any newspaper or magazine

not oversell the issue. Most importantly, responsibility and authority need to rest with one agency to insure one unified message is sent so as not to confuse the audience.

WWII is not a historical example to look to for TTPs on using PA to garner Domestic support for military operations in our current, persistent conflict, because the situations are too diverse. Without a declaration of war by congress, and the suspension of some rights, laws, and regulations, propaganda as conducted in WWII is not possible. The seizure of the moment immediately following an attack on American soil was a deliberate<sup>139</sup> yet missed opportunity to place the nation on a wartime footing and requesting congressional declaration would support the persuasion and propaganda necessary to maintain public support for the duration. The strategic communiqué of “for the duration” has its own impact of long war support. Along with seizing the moment for mobilization of a nation, is the immediacy of the threat and the corresponding emotive response.

The immediacy of the threat in today’s conflict is not the same as was conveyed and felt throughout WWII and the first years after 11 SEP 2001. The opportunity for seizing the initiative to mobilize the populace to help defend the threat to the American way of life has evaporated for the current conflict. The surge of patriotism and the outrage against an attack on American soil is fleeting, and if not captured and sustained the active support of the nation will erode as the conflict loses immediacy, impact, and importance in the daily lives of average Americans. Without a call for action and involvement on the part of Americans through either sacrifice, service, or support, the public will not have a sense of reciprocity and will become disinterested because they are not needed. The need, the urgency, the threat, the purpose, the righteousness of military action must all be used in the first days of crisis and conflict to build a base of support for long lasting public support such as was seen in WWII. Propaganda preys on those raw emotions, and persuasion uses those emotions to justify support and action necessary to wage war. The commitment of the people to the war effort is directly related to their

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explaining heavy weight, important public problems.” His own success with pictorial techniques led him to favor a more diluted form of presenting material.

<sup>139</sup> Admittedly, this was a deliberate action, which might have been taken due to the lack of a nation state named as an enemy. This deliberate action may have been to protect the strength of the nation, our economic power. However, the reasons for this deliberate action are well beyond the scope of this paper.

personal sacrifice, and the American public was not asked for a personal sacrifice as a whole. Without a national commitment at home, building a coalition and asking for a sacrifice from our allies is likely to be difficult to gain or sustain.

Social Influence in international conflict can be used at home as well as in public diplomacy abroad to gain and sustain support. This soft power requires: transparency; strategic patience, and commitment. We have successfully used transparency through the embedded media projects, the reality TV show, *Carrier*; and interactive web sites. The military should continue to use these direct appeals and outreaches to the American public to inform, educate, and confirm support of the public is well spent. The military should expand public affairs in the current conflict to include: outreach through all popular means of information sharing and distribution, mediated with educating their strongest voice, that of the individual service member, to empower them to be good ambassadors abroad and for DoD at home.<sup>140</sup>

In training service members to be perceptive communicators, training in cultural sensitivity and the power of language should be given considerable time and emphasis. The mistake of buying into the rhetoric of a ‘Jihad’ versus an accurate labeling of a ‘Hirabah’, may have resulted in prolonging the conflict by unintentionally strengthening the SC of the enemy. Changing what we currently call ‘Jihad’ to the correct term of ‘Hirabah’ has a limited effective window and may have to begin after another catalyst opens a new window. An example, albeit beyond the scope of this paper, maybe charging the detainees of Guantanamo Bay with Hirabah in an International Court. Correcting miscommunications or false communications is much more difficult than communicating with the correct words from the beginning. Words do matter, and they matter in the context of the global audience as well as more specific audiences.

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<sup>140</sup> “the characteristics of a public diplomacy organization that both satisfies the need to respond to authoritarian propaganda but yet allays the fears of Americans. These characteristics include: (a) transparency of operations and organization (i.e. Americans see and understand the nature of the influence campaign), (b) reliance on a series of checks and balances to prevent the illegitimate use of influence by the government, (c) use of influence must be consistent with democratic values given that actions speak louder than words, and (d) the influence campaign has the trust and consensus of the American people.” Anthony R. Pratkanis. "The Use of Influence in Public Diplomacy Before, During and After an International Conflict: A Social Influence Analysis." In *Hand Book of Public Diplomacy*, by Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor. (New York: Routledge, 2008), pg. 67.

No matter the audience, the message, the duration, or the strategic policy, a declaration of war is necessary to use the full force of the TTPs in SC and IE used in WWII. Without a declaration of war, the SC and IE will not be as effective in gaining and maintaining public support, simply because the impact and threat are not personally felt and thus the emotional support of the conflict will ebb and flow with the strength of the policy and the perceived short term success or failure on the battlefield, neither of which is conducive to a long war.

## **APPENDIX**

### **Counter Smith-Mundt Act Argument**

“The Smith-Mundt act. The twin devil of our inability to fight the enemy as it should be fought is the defeatist interpretation of an obsolete law aimed against the legacy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. That law is now invoked to prevent war-fighters, diplomats and other government officials from running effective information campaigns against the enemy. A tiny clause of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, known as the Smith-Mundt Act, forbids certain government officials and agencies from disseminating information in the U.S. that is intended for recipients abroad. In fact, many legal and ethical ways exist to prevent Smith-Mundt disciples from shutting down effective messaging operations if Congress is unwilling to change the law. When the widespread use of the Internet showed policymakers that technology had made the old laws obsolete, the Clinton Administration found an easy way around the obstacle. Legally, and with no objection or challenge, the administration circumvented Smith-Mundt by hosting Voice of America websites on servers physically located in foreign countries. That precedent remains in force, but is not used as widely as it might be. Public affairs officers (PAOs) often veto military information operations (IO) designed to exploit terrorist websites, on

the grounds that Arabic-speaking American citizens might see the U.S.- sponsored content and thus cause the military to be in violation of Smith-Mundt.”<sup>141</sup>

“The executive branch should obtain a realistic legal opinion of the application of Smith-Mundt and its limitations. The administration must instruct PAOs must abide by the letter and spirit of the up-to date legal interpretation. It must provide political support government-wide to give practitioners as much latitude as possible to do their hearts-and-minds work abroad. It must also ask Congress to modernize the law.”<sup>142</sup>

“The necessity to follow these recommendations is simple and obvious. We cannot fight and win a war of ideas by denying ourselves the primary means of engaging this adversary and by muting our influence warriors. Not when our enemy uses these same tools so effectively to mobilize its support base, intimidate opponents, discredit, and disparage us. We cannot concede this key terrain to our adversaries who then use it directly and indirectly to influence our domestic population, our politicians and our judges. We can and must contest this space. The enemy is already doing their best to deny these tools to us. We do not need to be complicit in this strategy.”<sup>143</sup>

## **What Influences Public Opinion**

According to COL William Darley, editor of Military Review Magazine, Clausewitz was insightful in his prediction that strong policies influenced public opinion more heavily than other influences.

In summary, as intimated by Clausewitz, the most important factor in tapping and shaping the “blind hatred” for an enemy that underpins public support for a conflict is aggressive, decisive national policy as reflected in bold actions to achieve clear, specific political and military objectives. Conversely, the absence of such focused and bold policy appears to be the primary factor that dissipates the resolve and focus of the people’s “moral forces.” It is also useful to note that such aggressive policy increasing the

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<sup>141</sup> J. Michael Waller. "Chapter 1: War Time Message-Making: An Immediate-Term Approach." In *Fighting the War of Idea like a Real War: Messages to Defeat the Terrorists*, by J. Michael Waller, 1-86. (Washington, DC: The Institute Of World Politics Press, 2007), pg. 20.

<sup>142</sup> J. Michael Waller. "Chapter 1: War Time Message-Making: An Immediate-Term Approach." In *Fighting the War of Idea like a Real War: Messages to Defeat the Terrorists*, by J. Michael Waller, 1-86. (Washington, DC: The Institute Of World Politics Press, 2007), pg. 20.

<sup>143</sup> J. Michael Waller. "Chapter 1: War Time Message-Making: An Immediate-Term Approach." In *Fighting the War of Idea like a Real War: Messages to Defeat the Terrorists*, by J. Michael Waller, 1-86. (Washington, DC: The Institute Of World Politics Press, 2007), pg. 20.

commitment of a people's moral forces to the cause would include policy measures to demand participation and sacrifice from citizens on the home front in building the "battle sword" of overwhelming force, as well as to fund and produce the robust logistical support systems that are required in the execution of grand national policy to achieve military objectives.<sup>144</sup>

## Hirabah vs. Jihad

By necessity, the American political counterattack in the "war of ideas" should be geared toward depriving radical elements of their ability to dominate religious semantics and rhetoric. In so doing, the U.S. will be helping to destroy the image of the enemy as hero – a crucial mechanism currently fueling the fight against the United States and its Coalition partners.

Doing so means adjusting U.S. rhetoric so as not to hinder civilized Muslims in the recovery of their ideas. If the current idea of jihad as terrorism is offensive to the average Muslim, who sees the same word as a just and good action blessed by God, then the U.S. must find another word to describe its enemy and its actions.<sup>145</sup>

The United States, then, must find ideas already in the Arabic language and Muslim culture that can be applied to describe Islamist terror. Fortunately, a thousand years of Islamic jurisprudence has already provided us with the proper word: *hirabah*. As Layla Sein of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists explains:

Since the concept of jihad comes from the root word *jahada* (to strive or struggle for self-betterment from an ethical-moral perspective) and that of *hirabah* comes from the root word *hariba* (to fight, to go to war or become enraged or angry), an etymological and theological examination of these words provides a valid framework through which the religious legitimacy of suicide bombings in today's global community can be analyzed... To delve into a comparative study of these Islamic concepts is to expose how *hirabah* is being paraded by terrorist groups as jihad. By defining *hirabah* as jihad, such terrorist groups as al Qaeda and others promote their terrorist agendas by misleading young, religiously motivated and impressionable Muslims to believe that killing unarmed and non-combatant civilians are activities of jihad, and hence a ticket to paradise... If activities of fear and terror associated with *hirabah* are used to define the meaning of jihad in hopes of recruiting Muslim youth to undertake suicide bombings and other criminal activities, Muslim theologians need to define the nature of what is happening to stop the hijacking of Islam by terrorists.<sup>146</sup>

*Hirabah* would be more appropriate and useful, not only for public diplomacy or political reasons, but for the purpose of destroying terrorist networks. U.S. federal law

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<sup>144</sup> William M. Darley. "War Policy, Public Support and the Media." *Parameters* (US Army War College), (Summer 2005): 121-134.

<sup>145</sup> Waller J. Michael Waller. "Chapter 3: Making Jihad work for America." In *Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War*, by J. Michael Waller. (Washington, DC: The Institute Of World Politics Press, 2007), pg. 14-15

<sup>146</sup> {Layla Sein, "Editorial," Association of Muslim Social Scientists *AMSS Bulletin* 3, no. 4 (2002)}. As quoted in J. Michael Waller. "Chapter 3: Making Jihad work for America." In *Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War*, by J. Michael Waller. (Washington, DC: The Institute Of World Politics Press, 2007).



enforcement officials refer to Islamist terrorists as “jihadis,” as do the Armed Forces and counterterrorism strategists.<sup>147</sup>

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